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POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1971

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IMPORTANCE OF NEW CIVIL CODES IN DEFENDING PARTY POLICY

Tirana RRUGA E PARTISE in Albanian Sep 81 pp 72-78

[Article by Vahid Lama: "Problems of the Recent Plenums of the Central Committee of the Albanian Workers Party--The Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure Are Important Documents Which Express and Protect the Party Policy"]

[Text] The disappearance of private ownership and the prevention by law of the exploitation of one person by another, and the establishment, development, and perfection of socialist relations in production, as well as the broadening of the sphere of relations regarding socialist wealth among state enterprises, and between them and the agricultural cooperatives, have brought deep changes of a revolutionary nature to the economic bases of our society, on which, among other things, the superstructure and all juridical opinions and standards are based and established. These changes in our economic bases, which were achieved under the leadership of the party, laid down the task that, after the drafting of the new constitution and in accordance with Marxist-Leninist ideology, and on the basis of the experience gained by the state and economic organs in the implementation of the civil legislation, the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure should be drafted and approved.

The approval of these codes at the 7th Session of the Legislature of the 9th Assembly of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania marks another step forward in the perfection of socialist legislation, especially legislation in the civil area. The Civil Code regulates relations related to wealth and those not related to wealth between the economic enterprises, the institutions, the agricultural cooperatives, the social organizations and the citizens, as well as relations among the citizens themselves. Whereas, the Code of Civil Procedure ensures, among other things, the implementation of those relations which are regulated by the Civil Code for a just solution and a quick judgement of civil matters, struggling against bureaucracy and liberalism.

The Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure are separate laws. Each has its own objective in the sphere of relations which it regulates. However, as an integral part of the sole socialist law, they are closely related to each other. The content of the Code of Civil Procedure is defined to a great extent by the Civil Code.

In expressing the relationship between the law and procedure, Marx wrote that "court procedure and the law are as closely related to each other as, for example, plants belonging to the same plant family are related to each other, as animal groups are related to each other in flesh and blood. The same spirit must permeate the court procedure, because the procedure is the life form of the law, therefore, an expression of its inner life" (K. Marx and F. Engels, Works, Vol. I, Published in Russian 1955, p. 158). Given this thought, we can say that the Code of Civil Procedure is the life form of the Civil Code.

The Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure, as components of the civil legislation, are documents of great ideological, political, economic, social, and juridical value. As Article 3 of each one of them says, they are guided by the policies of the Albanian Workers Party [AWP] and are based on Marxist-Leninist ideology. These two laws as the other laws in our land, in compliance with the Constitution, openly affirm the guiding role of the party and the dominance of the ideology of the working class. This spirit permeates every one of their provisions. The law, by expressing the will of the class in power, will reflect and protect, as a matter of course, the ideology of that class. As a result, people who are involved in civil law cases must respect the ideological principles of Marxism-Leninism which guide socialist coexistence and the standards of communist morality.

The affirmation of the guiding role of the party and the dominance of the Marxist-Leninist ideology in our civil legislation is a very important theoretical and practical characteristic. This affirmation, among others, is of theoretical importance because it opposes the bourgeois doctrines of the law, according to which legislation, especially that which is implemented in the civil area, supposedly is not linked with the ideology or the policy of any single party, but is supposedly guided by the idea of "human rights", and pretends to serve "the interests of society as a whole" because "justice must be treated as divorced from politics, economics" and so on. At the same time, our civil legislation contravenes the theories of modern revisionists who preach that justice supposedly expresses the will of all the people; it also contravenes their ideas on "ideological pluralism". Our civil legislation confirms the Leninist principle that the dictatorship of the proletariat can only be achieved through the communist party and that socialism can only be constructed on the basis of the ideology of the working class. The sanctioning in our civil legislation of the guiding role of the party and of the Marxist-Leninist ideology is of practical importance as well, because, in the interpretation and implementation of the law, when people are involved in matters of law, as jurists or private citizens, they need in every instance to follow the economic policy of the party and the party's Marxist-Leninist ideology, because the law expresses in a concentrated form the political, ideological, economic, and organizational line of the party as it applies to defined social relations; all the laws in their entirety are composed of the broad party line, which has been realized in different sectors of life, even on its simplest levels.

The Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedures approve the principle of the class struggle. This principle--which, for well-known reasons, people have tried to separate the law from the functions of the state as a political class organism that rules economically--is not accepted by bourgeois law and has not

been sanctioned juridically by the law of those countries where revisionists are in power. The manifestation of this principle in our civil legislation denounces, once again, the sermons of bourgeois ideology that, supposedly, the state is not the dictatorship of the ruling class, but supposedly is "an impartial arbiter to protect law and order in general." It also denounces the revisionist principle which says that, in socialism, the class struggle is ended. By proclaiming and defending these principles in the area of civil law and civil procedure, our party has held faithfully to Lenin's idea that "the dictatorship of the proletariat is a continuation of the class struggle of the proletarian under new forms" (V. I. Lenin, Works, Vol. 30, p. 90). This truth has been proved in an irrefutable way by the experience of socialism in the world. The revisionist counterrevolution in the Soviet Union and elsewhere was a harsh class struggle against the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist order at a time when the old exploiting classes have already been liquidated.

Another important problem of principle and of vital importance for socialist construction in our land, which is endorsed by the Civil Code and is based on the constitution, is the prohibition of the granting of concessions and the creation of joint companies and other foreign economic and financial institutions with or in cooperation with monopolies, capitalists, bourgeois, and revisionist countries, as well as the prohibition of the taking of credits from them. This presentation of the norm of the Constitution in the Civil Code is derived from our party's Marxist concept that "no country, regardless of how large or small, can build socialism by receiving help and credits from the bourgeoisie and the revisionists; by integrating its economy in the deceit of the world capitalist economic system" (Enver Hoxha, Report to the 7th Congress of the AWP, p. 30). The correctness of the implementation of this principle has been fully proved in the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, which is successfully building socialism in the heart of European capitalism and bourgeois-revisionism by completely relying on its own forces and keeping at the same time, in an exemplary manner, political and economic independence. All the countries which have accepted credits and "aid" from capitalist countries have submitted to the activity of the economic laws of capitalism; they have fallen prey to the covetousness of others and have lost their national sovereignty. This is the path of betrayal taken by revisionist cliques, who have left in their wake economic chaos, loss of sovereignty, and huge debts for now and for generations to come.

In a special part of the Civil Code, based upon the Constitution, various aspects of civil rights have been dealt with, the most important being the right of ownership.

Ownership is the central institute of civil law. It defines the juridical character of all the other institutes of this branch of our socialist law. The Code reflects the important changes that have taken place since the first decree "on ownership" came into existence. The collectivization of agriculture was successfully concluded during this period; gradually, part of group property became state property. The land was transferred to state ownership and private ownership disappeared; the social product increased to a great extent and the organization of production was further perfected, and so on. As a result, these qualitative changes in ownership relations brought about the creation of a new economic situation: the transformation of a national economy into a completely

socialist economy. The changes mentioned above are reflected in the Civil Code because, as is well known, ownership is not only an economic and social relationship, but is, at the same time, a juridical relationship, regulated and protected by the law.

The Civil Code embodies the Marxist-Leninist theory of the Constitution that the basis of the economic order of the socialist system of relations in production is socialist ownership of the means of production in both its forms: state and cooperative ownership, in which the former is higher and is responsible for enforcing both forms of ownership. Priority belongs to socialist state ownership, whose pace of development greatly influences the development of cooperative ownership. Personal ownership, on the other hand, is derived from socialist ownership, its source is the participation of citizens in work in the socialist economy. In compliance with these principled criteria, it endorses the idea that, in the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, wealth comes under the ownership of the state, the agricultural cooperatives, and individuals.

The Constitution and the Civil Code have defined the state and the agricultural cooperatives as the lawful subjects of socialist ownership, whereas they have defined individual citizens as lawful subjects of personal ownership. The state is the sole owner of all state property, which includes "the land; the resources of the subsoil; mines; forests; grazing lands; waters; natural energy resources; mills and factories; machinery and tractor stations; banks; all lines of communication; rail, water, and air transportation; post and telegraph offices; telephone lines; radio and television stations; and cinematography" (Article 18 of the Constitution and Article 70 of the Civil Code). The agricultural cooperative, as the group representing the farm workers; as a juridical person, is a collective owner and not the representative of any single member of this organization. "Buildings, machinery, equipment, transportation vehicles, tools and working instruments, beasts of burden and production, fruit trees, agricultural and animal products, as well as other means necessary to run this activity are the property of the agricultural cooperative (Article 21 of the Constitution and Article 74 of the Civil Code). The citizen can consider as personal property, "income from work and other lawful sources, residential dwellings and other things which help to fulfill the material and cultural needs of one's self and family" (Article 23 of the Constitution and Article 77 of the Civil Code). The law governing personal property includes objects of value which concern the cooperative family and are based on the statute which governs agricultural cooperatives.

The explanation of property rights in the Civil Code ensures the inviolability of socialist property and its protection from capitalist degeneration. For this reason, the law declares that personal property cannot be used to harm the social interests, or to encroach on the rights of state enterprises and institutions to be the sole administrator of state property, within the powers defined by the law and according to their functions and the duties of the state plan, but they cannot be subjects of exclusive state ownership because the right belongs only to the state.

Inheritance rights are linked to the rights of personal property. Inheritance rights in our socialist society, like property rights, have a character and

content that is completely contrary to the inheritance rights in bourgeois countries and in countries where revisionists dominate. In bourgeois revisionist countries, where private ownership flourishes, inheritance rights are a way of protecting and increasing, from generation to generation, the exploitation of the oppressed masses by the wealthy. This social injustice has come to an end once and for all in the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, where the disappearance of private ownership greatly diminished this institution, but, as one of the victories of ownership, it is dealt with in the Civil Code where it covers the transfer, by law or by a will of property, from a deceased person to one or several of his heirs. In our country, this right embodies new advanced norms in complete agreement with the socialist principles of humanism and the policy of the party. Lawful heirs, according to our law, are "children and grandchildren, spouses and parents, brothers and sisters, as well as the children of surviving brothers and sisters, grandparents, disabled dependents of the deceased and the state" (Article 103 of the Civil Code). All the above mentioned inherit according to the order defined by law. From the circle of heirs recognized by the law, secondary heirs are in line to inherit only when there are no primary heirs. Thus, for example, if the deceased has no primary heirs, such as children, spouse, and a parent unable to work, the working parent of the deceased and others cannot inherit because they are secondary heirs.

Contracts are important means which directly serve to fulfill the state plan, as well as the material and cultural needs of the working masses. Contractual relations are part of the discipline of the plan. They serve to implement the economic policy of the party for coordinating consumption with production and for realizing the goals of production. Within the whole system of the socialist management of the economy, an important role is played by the accurate implementation of contractual relations and duties between the enterprises among themselves and between them and the agricultural cooperatives. This fact has been proved by the work experience in the area of implementing the duties of the plan. The positive experience gained in this direction is reflected in the civil code, where the meaning, type, and content of the contract; its relations; and its effects have been defined.

The correct evaluation and implementation of the legal provisions of the contract serve as very important tools in the hands of the state and the economic organs for fulfilling on time all the economic, technological, and financial indicators of the plan, in kind and in value, so as to eliminate certain biased, global, bureaucratic, and liberal expressions which are noted in the area of implementing the contractual duties and which, left alone, will lead to the distortion of the economic policy of the party, to expressions of spontaneity in production, to bargaining; "scratch my back and I'll scratch yours". Comrade Enver Hoxha teaches us that "the exact implementation of contractual duties is an inseparable part of the duties of the plan, it is, in fact, one of the most important because, however well we fulfill the tasks in production, in all its indicators, if we do not fulfill the contract and all its conditions on time, we have not realized the principal goal of material production, that is to say, the placement of production in the service of the user and the consumer" (Enver Hoxha, Reports and Speeches 1972-1973, p. 194). These valuable lessons from Comrade Enver Hoxha have been kept in mind in the formulation of provisions which deal with contracts in a special part of the Civil Code.

Besides ownership, inheritance, and contracts, the Civil Code also handles and regulates other civil rights matters, such as relations in civil law and juridical actions, subjects of civil juridical relations, representation, statute of limitations cases, the right of authors and obligations which result from damage or injuries, and so on.

All the juridical means which are anticipated by the code serve to implement civil legislation and ensure the realization of tasks in the economic field, as well as the construction of socialism according to the principle of relying on our forces. However, lawful means by themselves are insufficient in realizing the goals of the law, if their establishment does not become a concern of the masses. Laws are necessary, but the "decisive factor which will ensure the preservation, protection, enforcement, and further strengthening of the social ownership, as the open letter of the Central Committee of the party says, is to place the whole nation on guard for its protection." The criminal "can hide from regulations and the law, but he can never hide from the people." (AWP, Principal Documents, Vol. V, Tirana, 1974, p. 28). Therefore, it is very important to know the established law, its deep ideological, political, and juridical content, and to have a transformation in the inner convictions of all the workers in our country of the need to conscientiously respect the laws.

The basic party organs and organizations, the state and economic organs, and all the other levers of the party, must work in a programmed manner to propagandize these codes, the duties which are derived from them, the sanctions which are called for in them, and the necessity to implement them. The task of propagandizing the laws, as the experience in our country has demonstrated, belongs not only to the courts and to the offices of the attorney general, but to all the state and economic organs, because all of them, without exception, in their functions are involved in the implementation of the law. In this matter, we must keep in mind the recommendations of Comrade Enver Hoxha that every forum, collegially or individually, every executive committee, people's council, factory manager, all of them, must become familiar with the laws which concern them, they must know how to resolve the thought and content of the law, and they must oversee their strict implementation. Civil legislation, like all our legislation, is known for the fiarness of the principles it sanctions, for the reasonable decisions it gives, and for the intelligent and lucid presentations it makes. Our legislation is original, built on the basis of the realities of the times and on prospects for socialist construction in our country. While progressing on the path of the continuous improvement of the law, our civil law has abandoned certain institutions of the law which today have been left behind and have been overcome by the conditions of our life. These are full ownership by the cooperative family, burdens (servitude), deposits, pawning, mortgates, and so on. The court of civil procedures does not charge court taxes, does not take to court a spouse who pays other beneficiaries in the inheritance through the sale of property at auctions, etc. Many legal provisions have been pruned of unnecessary explanations which made work difficult, especially in the Code of Civil Procedure. The Seventh Congress of the Party had laid down the duty for the government organs and the state administration organs, in cooperation with the mass organizations to exploit the existing capabilities better in order to solve correctly a series of problems which deal with the violation of our social norms, such as expressions of foreign attitudes toward work and social

ownership, and they must not allow these matters to go to the organs of justice at every instance. The implementation of this important task, which was put into operation right after the Seventh Party Congress, has shown that this kind of work, when it is done with care and without formalization, exercises a powerful educational influence with the popular masses. It is for this reason that the Code of Civil Procedure, by not accepting the old concept, according to which the only means of protecting civil rights was to examine them in court, has raised to the level of the law the demand that state organs, courts, and offices of legal aid work seriously and skillfully to find new ways and means to implement the tasks to prevent civil juridical misunderstandings.

The Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure, as elements of the superstructure of our society, expressing the party policy, reflect the objective laws of the development of the socialist society. In this manner, they will play an important role in strengthening economic relations, they will serve as a powerful tool in our people's great struggle under the leadership of the party for the construction of socialism, and they will fulfill the stipulated duty to protect the socialist state, the Albanian Workers Party, the lawful interests of the enterprises, the institutions, the agricultural cooperatives, the social organizations, and the citizens.

6160
CSO: 2100/25

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ZMW, ZSMP RURAL ACTIVITIES DISCUSSED

Warsaw SZTANDAR MLODYCH in Polish 26 Oct 81 p 4

[Article by (kas)]

[Text] There are, however, two organizations that attempt to bring together in their ranks young people from rural areas. Reactivated after several years of nonexistence, the Rural Youth Union aspires to regain its past influence, and the Union of Socialist Polish Youth does not give up its activity in rural areas.

In view of the above are conflicts and fierce rivalry "for the souls" necessary? Must the artificial division exist, must it contribute to the creation of antagonisms and consequently lead to setting at odds and splitting the young rural generation? At central levels frequent clashes ensue between these two organizations. There are various reasons for this: old unfinished business can be traced to when the Rural Youth Union and Union of Socialist Youth were merged, matters connected with the final division of their assets, etc. Not insignificant causes are considerations of a prestigious nature. The leadership is, therefore, not exemplary; consequently it contributes to sharp conflicts in villages and parishes in various regions of the country, although fortunately not everywhere.

Despite differences in programs, a common activity for the good of all rural youth is possible, as exemplified by the Warsaw Capital Voivodship. Maybe it results because the chairman of the Warsaw Board of the Union of Socialist Polish Youth, Zdzislaw Sirojc, and the deputy chairman of the same body responsible for rural youth activities are both former activists of the Rural Youth Union. Perhaps, together with Krystyna Mielniczuk, chairwoman of the Warsaw Capital Board of the Rural Youth Union, they simply concluded that since both organizations aspire to care for rural youth, it does not make sense to waste time and energy for pointless quarrels; the common ground of cooperation should be considered, while organizational [illegible] programmatic autonomy are maintained.

A good idea was conceived by the Presidium of the Warsaw Capital Voivodship Committee of the United Peasant Party, which invited chairmen of the Warsaw Capital Voivodship Boards of the Union of Socialist Polish Youth and the Rural Youth Union in order--as defined by the chairman of the Warsaw Capital Voivodship Committee of the United Peasant Party, Stanislaw Szewczyk--to examine together the direction of activity in the rural youth: "We would like also to find out what problems you have and what kind of help from us you expect."

Krystyna Mielniczuk presented very difficult material situation of the Rural Youth Union. "We work as volunteers, we do not have any paid positions or any means of transportation. Making copies of the most important documents or information is a major problem for us. Any kind of help for us is, therefore, very much appreciated. I would like to thank you, Mr Chairman, for making available your Fiat 126p. It is the only car at our disposal. Unfortunately, in spite of frequent declarations from local village and gmina units of the United Peasant Party, their help boils down to the expression of good intentions.

"Work with rural youth of the Warsaw Capital Voivodship is particularly difficult; without a proper basis and means it is a Sisyphean effort. We note a loss of rural identity. Young people do not feel attached either to a village or to a town. Their home is a bus or a train, where they spend several hours daily commuting to their school or work. This is the reason for the loose ties young people have with the countryside; the lack of the so-called local patriotism and self-governing traditions results in the inability of youth to get organized. We have a basis of leadership cadres, committed activists from among the academic youth, but the lack of housing and other necessities makes our work difficult."

The chairwoman of the Warsaw Capital Board of the Rural Youth Union stressed also that the Warsaw Capital Voivodship is one of the rare ones without friction with the Union of Socialist Polish Youth--in spite of differences in methods and aims of their activities.

Zdzisaw Sirojc pointed out that it is fortunate that the Warsaw Capital authorities of the Rural Youth Union do not treat the Union of Socialist Polish Youth as an unhealthy competition in the village.

"One of the main aims of our activity is the implementation of the idea of the alliance of workers and peasants. We are glad that our colleagues from the Rural Youth Union understand that only by our presence in the rural milieu can we implement our program. When we are witnessing growing antagonisms between the village and the town because of the food crisis, our activities become particularly significant. We do not disturb one another; where it is possible we will support one another, simply because both our organizations aim at the welfare of rural youth. Division would only harm both the rural milieu and each of our organizations.

Summing up the discussion, the chairman of the Warsaw Capital Voivodship Committee of the United Peasant Party expressed his satisfaction that more unites than divides the Rural Youth Union and the Union of Socialist Polish Youth. This portends effective cooperation for the welfare of the village. At the same time he made a commitment that the United Peasant Party will assist both organizations in the implementation of their programs.

"One should not divide rural youth. We should try to take advantage of the organizational duality for the revitalization of this milieu," he said in conclusion.

9644
CSO: 2600/90

ZSMP MAIN BOARD CHAIRMAN JASKIERNIA INTERVIEWED

Szczecin KURIER SZCZECINSKI in Polish 2 -22 Nov 81 p 5

[Interview with Jerzy Jaskiernia, chairman of the Main Board, Union of Socialist Polish Youth (ZSMP), by Maciej Czekaja: "Bounce Back From the Bottom at All Costs"]

[Text] [Question] Shortly following the Third Exceptional ZSMP Congress, you acted as host in Szczecin. I gave our newspaper's readers an account of your meeting with the people involved in the youth movement in Szczecin Voivodship. At that time you were an optimist, a person giving the impression that you have your own program of action which you had already begun to implement very consistently. I also got the impression that the renewal which after August took in the whole country had a different nature in the youth movement. It simply began from "the top" and everything seems to show, or at least did show, that now the breeze of renewal which is constructive is about to descend to the lower levels, which means to your voivodship, town, city-district, plant administration, and circles levels.

Today, given the perspective of several months which have passed since this meeting, I want to ask you a few questions related to the Szczecin meeting and to yourself, to your observations, your feelings, and your opinions. Hence, let me ask you if you are still the optimist you were 6 months ago. I the implementation of the program of the ZSMP Congress and your own decisions going the way it was set down in the ZSMP leadership?

[Answer] It has already been 6 months since the Extraordinary ZSMP Congress, and many ZSMP activists are asking questions of this sort today, but this complex set of deliberations should be viewed on two planes: the general political plane and the intraorganizational plane, because in looking at the issues we want to accomplish and settle, it is necessary to pick out those which are related to the functioning of ZSMP, that is, those over which we have direct control, and to differentiate between them and those issues which are conditioned by the broader development of the political situation.

So, in what real do negative phenomena appear? Well, the Third Extraordinary ZSMP Congress, although it was convened a few months after August, nonetheless met during a period when there was still a certain optimism that this transitional state was something which would last a few months at most, but would end a some moment. At that time there was the general conviction that we had just about reached bottom and were on our way back, that the self-government mechanism was going to function, that the new political and social forces were becoming a part of the process of the country's functioning, and that in this situation there would be the opportunity for a more effective resolution of the problems of young people.

Meanwhile, from month to month the sociopolitical conditions have been getting worse. For example, let us take the issue of raising credit limits for young married couples from 50,000 zlotys to 70,000. Right after August this seemed to be progress. Today, given the destruction of the market situation and the growing inflation, this is not progress. Let us take a key issue for young people, like housing construction. The brickworks are being closed. The building materials plants are being eliminated. When we look at all this through the prism of reality, it seems to me that our ZSMP has wound up in an unusually difficult situation. The young people are expecting their matters to be handled in a more straightforward fashion, that there will be self-government, democracy, and so on, but on the other hand, the actual political context of decisions is getting continually worse. And this is the very reason why in this realm I am far less optimistic today. I continue to emphasize that the cause is not lost, but I think that until our system gets into the groove, until we achieve some minimum political stability and along with it the accompanying economic and social stability that go with it, the organization which has its own specific goals will not be able to achieve them. And today this is an issue over which we have absolutely no control.

[Question] Well then, over what does ZSMP and its leadership have an influence?

[Answer] We have noticed important defects in the functioning and construction of the Union. There was a basic problem related to the fact that since 1973 we have become "derived" from the secondary schools, technical schools, and institutions of higher education. The organization lost its membership base in the form of schools and its intellectual backing in the educational institutions. Today we are breaking down. Beginning this 1 September we have expanded our activity to all types of schools. Of course, this is not a rapid process. Our strong circles and boards have not suddenly appeared from one day to the next. But there is no longer the situation which practically speaking limited our possibilities to operate in this community. Therefore the conditions have appeared to create a ZSMP base. I am convinced that this generation of ZSMP activists now in the schools will acquire experience, and this will pay off sometime in the future. The same is true of the educational institutions. From the viewpoint of a multicommunity nature in the Union, we have done what our organization expected of us.

Let us take another aspect of our post-August activity, independence. I do not know whether in the history of ZSMP or that of its predecessors there has been as far-reaching independence as now. Many people who are acquainted with the inner history can confirm this. From the viewpoint of the shaping and implementation of the program, the situation is identical. Nobody thrusts a program on us, modifies it, or puts pressure on us.

Two the problems arise nevertheless against the backdrop of this phenomenon. First, from one extreme in the form of the fact that before the congress people said that the whole program, for example, of the ZSMP circle, is thrust on us and guided by the upper echelons of ZSMP, we went to the other extreme, where we went over to complete independence, which often means a lack of effects. It turns out that independence is often dangerous. Therefore we are presently at the stage of seeking a middle road: What to do in order not to return to direction from above, at the same time making it possible for the circles to operate effectively?

The other issue which has come into view against this backdrop is solitude. Before we talked about direction, and today we are starting to talk about being alone.

[Question] In part of your statement one observes an attempt to explain away the weak activity of most voivodship echelons of ZSMP.

[Answer] I would not generalize it that way. It is my feeling that one voivodship is not the same as another. No general opinion about ZSMP can be accurate. I know about marvelous voivodship boards and about weak ones. I know about wonderful gmina [parish] boards and about miserable ones.

With respect to the voivodships, I will go back to your initial question. Within the organization we have gone over to the following concept: first a congress, and then later we go to the campaign, and now the election campaign is reaching the voivodship level. On the other hand, you must take into account the operation of a certain psychological mechanism. Often operating in t voivodship are people who already know they are leaving. They do not have certain motives for acting. This is a factor which in practice delays meritorical activity, but this is the very reason we brought pressure to make the election campaign come to a conclusion this year, because the long the process went on, the longer there would be inertia in certain voivodship elements.

[Question] Let us return once more to independence in ZSMP, about which you spoke. How should we take the case of SZTANDAR MLODYCH, the recall of the editor in chief without going through the process of having the Main Board of ZSMP give its opinion?

[Answer] Right away here a basic issue needs to be explained. The general public thinks that SZTANDAR MLODYCH is an organ or publication of ZSMP. This is not true. It is correct that during the Third ZSMP

Congress there were deliberations concerned with making SZTANDAR MLODYCH a ZSMP publication. At that time there were arguments that after all there are the scouts and the student organization SZSP, and in this situation the newspaper cannot be ascribed to any concrete organization. As a result, SZTANDAR MLODYCH is the daily publication of young people.

As for the change in the editor-in-chief of SZTANDAR, from the formal point of view there is no obligation to consult us on the decision. Nonetheless, we pointed out to the sociopolitical leadership that, owing to the nature of the publication and the fact that it is associated with us in the minds of the public, the lack of consultation on this matter was a mistake. We brought up the problem, in order to determine how the publication should be situated in the future, because it must have some sort of relationship to the youth organization.

[Question] Are you acquainted with the fact that employees of the ZSMP Workers' University in Szczecin were conducting protest actions?

[Answer] I admit that against the backdrop of the number of actions which are currently going on in the country, somewhere somebody is constantly... Formal information on the protest action of the Workers' University in Szczecin has not reached me, but I do know that there is the issue there of changing the director, the change being made by the local ZSMP Voivodship Board Presidium. The party in question appealed the decision, and other institutions also sent us their views on the subject. We appointed a commission made up of members of the Central Audit Commission and social activists to go there and examine the issue on the spot. From Warsaw it is difficult to determine the motives for the action taken there in Szczecin. We are trying to see that the decision in this matter is just and honest. I do not want to be "led" by anybody on this. At the same time we do not want to go in the direction of blocking any sort of change, because it is just here that the arguments are divided, and in a meritorical issue I would not like to take a stand, because I do not know the party in question, and I have not gone enough into the various arguments to tell you anything more here about this in the course of our interview. On the other hand, we have taken action to see that the issue is examined and clarified.

[Question] Then let us conclude our interview. But I cannot keep from asking the following question: When can we expect -- in a month, 2 months, or half a year -- please set the timeframe yourself -- that you will be able to say that nonetheless your optimism, as expressed in assuming the duties of chairman of the ZSMP Main Board, is or was optimism founded in reality?

[Answer] I will answer the question this way: That depends on the further development of the sociopolitical situation in the country. If the situation develops in the direction it is going at the present time and tends to a certain destruction of the system or some sort of long hangover, then I think that there is no need for such a meeting, because the organization will share the fate of the system, the fate of political

mechanisms. I do not know what sort of regulations will be introduced in this place. On the other hand, if we achieve equilibrium, not in the sense of economic balance, because that is the long-range prospect of from 2 to 4 years, but if we bounce back from the bottom and are beginning to go towards a certain stability, which will make it possible to resolve the problems of young people, then I do not think we would have to wait very long for such a meeting. I think that we would expect it in perhaps a year. This is not a very optimistic date, but nonetheless...

On the other hand, I would like to add one thing. I do not want the readers to get the impression from our interview that pessimism is hampering the Union's ability to operate. I am not mentioning individual opinions, because there are so many various views today that daily I receive a stack of extremely different views coming in from the field. I think that we have broken through a great barrier in the realm of the flow of information into ZSMP. This is the circulatory system of ZSMP. It is a thing of capital importance. Many activists say that the quality of ZSMP action depends on it along with what it does to see that the group of activists is informed so that it can make decisions on the basis of a good understanding of the current situation. Although it may soon disappear, I think it is disturbing that there has been a decline in the initiative to create a Council of Ministers Committee on Youth. During the meeting in Szczecin I pointed out that many of the problems which ZSMP is undertaking -- let me emphasize, those in the social and existential sphere -- occur in the broader context which depends on the country's economic situation, and in the decision making sphere they depend on the creation of a certain platform for the analysis and solution of the issues of youth, and it is here that we are disturbed to find that it has already been 6 months since the ZSMP Congress, another month since the party congress, where the matter was listed, but the issue is not being resolved. Everyone knows that today the cause is not to be found on the side of the government or the people making the political deicisions but on the size of the nonuniformity of positions of the other youth organizations, which are either registering their disinterest in the affair or are bringing up some sort of doubts. One thing is disturbing: that we not stop with merely registering the doubts. Unless we show young people that certain platforms are being created to resolve its affairs and these two or three issues we are not resolving, it is going to be tremendously difficult for the organization to have any credibility or for the authorities or the state to have any credibility either, because realities are what count.

Of course I would not boil ZSMP's issues down merely to social issues. ZSMP cannot be treated like a restaurant one goes to, eats in, and walks out of, and we are disturbed that there is too little to eat. Our activity also consits of the issue of upbringing and moral training work, of patriotism, and today this is an open problem. The question of wiping out the blank spots in historical awareness. And in this area there are no barriers keeping ZSMP from taking action comprehensively, so my own special pessimism rests on the fact that many people association ZSMP

with certain expectations and aspirations of working young people. But progress in this realm depends on general stability in the country.

[Question] Which means that you do not regret having exchanged your scholar's office at the Jagiellonian University for this office?

[Answer] I will tell you that after 6 months' work here a person has things more cut out for him than after several years' work at the university. This by no means speaks badly for the work here or there. To be chairman of ZSMP and be chairman of ZSMP--it is a question of the time-frame. The work is hard. You can work even 24 hours a day and still have it turn how here or there that...

I do not regret my decision. What would have done as a scholar for 6 months? I would have written some sort of paper, a chapter of a book. These 6 months which I have spent in Warsaw have been a tremendous source of satisfaction and a tremendous life experience. Somebody once said that Paris is worth a mass. The experience I have already gained is worth a great deal. I do not feel frustrated as a scholar, because I dealt with state law. So today I am dealing with exactly the same thing, only on a practical level.

[Question] Thank you for the interview, and, speaking as an optimist, I will say: "I will be seeing you next year."

10790
CSO: 2600/153

SWISS PAPER POINTS TO SOVIET JAMMING OF BROADCASTS TO POLAND

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 16 Jan 82 p 4

[Article by W.H.: "Polish Airwaves Screened Off"]

[Text] Shortwave broadcasts in Polish by the Voice of America and the BBC are being methodically jammed since late December 1981. All language broadcasts to East Europe and the Soviet Union by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty are also being jammed. Thus far, the Polish services of Deutsche Welle and Deutschlandfunk, like the expanded programming of Radio France Internationale and Radio Vatican, have not been affected. In other words, VOA Polish programs are being subjected to massive jamming for the first time in 25 years and BBC broadcasts for the first time in 18—in direct violation of Helsinky final act and the Madrid followup conference.

Carefully Planned Action

Both broadcasting services, along with Deutsche Welle and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, have complained about the total jamming of their Russian programs since the summer of 1980. That particular move had no doubt been carefully planned and was introduced in one fell swoop. The latest measures, on the other hand, were introduced step by step which seems to indicate a degree of improvisation.

It started when some VOA broadcasts were jammed intermittently on 28 December of last year. 3 days later, systematic jamming began. Although VOA expanded its Polish broadcasts threefold to 5 hours a day at New Year's, all frequencies were already being jammed on 2 January. BBC, too, added to its Polish broadcasts. Jamming started a few days later on a frequency-by-frequency basis until by 4 January all broadcasts were affected.

Trackings indicate beyond the shadow of a doubt that all jammers are located in the Soviet Union—one in the Ukraine near Smolensk and the other in the Kaliningrad area. The British government has already launched a strong protest with Moscow against these latest hindrances to the free flow of information.

The Jamming Principle

Jamming can be effected locally or regionally. In all populated areas, the Soviet Union operates groups of jamming transmitters which feed omni-directional antennas and which put out a strong jamming signal on the chosen frequency within the reach of their groundwaves. This system calls for a great deal of technology and is costly; it also requires a communication network of its own in order to coordinate the jamming measures. In between the populated areas thus affected and rural, sparsely populated areas reception of foreign broadcasts is still possible, albeit in a restricted way in some instances.

Concentrated local jamming is augmented by area-wide jamming which is effective only on shortwave, however, where the sky wave reflected by the ionosphere is brought into play. Use is made of high-capacity transmitters at distances of 2,000-4,000 kilometers from the target area. Such a system is presently in operation, directed toward Poland since that country does not have a great many ground wave jammers at its disposal.

The jammers transmit heavily overmodulated signals. In the past, jamming was restricted to transmitting the second Soviet all-union program "Mayak" or machine noises and howling sirens. But now, special "programs" in the FM mode are transmitted via amplitude modulation. Most of the time these programs consist of American pop music of the forties or tape loops with brief spoken texts.

Permanent Soviet Radio Surveillance

One way to counter to these activities was to change frequencies rapidly; but this called for the listener in the target area to switch frequencies as well. But modern jammers can "follow along" in just a few seconds and periodic checks by Western broadcasters prove that the Soviet Union has all frequencies under constant surveillance and reacts in each instance.

A more effective antidote is to put the jammers "on a starvation diet" by coordinating program schedules internationally and operating on as many frequencies as possible until the jammer's potential is exhausted and at least one frequency gets through unjammed. This technique is known as "barrage broadcasting." In the Polish case, it soon became clear that the Soviet Union did not have sufficient reserves at its disposal and was forced to "transfer" transmitters jamming the Czech broadcasts of RFE. During the past few days, however, this shortfall was made up for by activating military transmitters.

Possible Countermeasures

Aside from operating very strong transmitters which can get through the jamming signal in the reception area, the best way of countering sky wave jamming is to make use of the "twilight effect" which applies when there is daylight at the jamming transmitter site but when the transmitter to be jammed is located in the twilight or night zone of the earth. At such times, the original signal is still reflected by the ionosphere but the jamming signal is absorbed totally or in part. This means that broadcasts from West to East can still be transmitted

but cannot be effectively jammed from East to West. Several RFE/RL transmitters located in Portugal make use of this technique. VOA broadcasts to Poland from Wooferton, England (using BBC facilities), from Kavala, Greece and from Tangiers in Morocco. Here, too, an attempt is made to capitalize on wintertime "skip conditions" so as to get through on higher frequencies until 8 pm local time. The VOA's Munich shortwave transmitter also broadcasts Polish programs; but it is the medium wave transmitter in Munich that is being used most of all which the jammers can do nothing about and which can be heard at times throughout Poland after dark.

BBC broadcasts to Poland mostly from Wooferton; only in the late afternoon is the Cyprus relay station used on one frequency. London takes advantage above all of the power shortage in Poland. Polish radio has been assigned the 207 m frequency to the 2000-kW transmitter at Konstantynov and the 200 kHz frequency to the 200-kW facility in Warsaw, both on long wave. This latter frequency is also being used by the BBC domestic service's "Radio Four" and by the World Service during the early morning hours. To save energy, Warsaw had to reduce transmissions on this frequency some time ago and has now had to shut them down altogether. Stations in Moscow and Leningrad, also operating on 200 kHz cannot compete with the 400 kW signal from Droitwich which leaves English-speaking Poles with access to Western information sources as long as Moscow does not decide to jam the Warsaw frequency, too.

Advantages for Polish Shortwave Listeners

Polish ham radio operators (who have been prohibited from broadcasting since the imposition of martial law) and dedicated shortwave listeners have found another way out. Outside regular programming, VOA Polish programs are broadcast in single sideband transmissions from Greenville, North Carolina to European and African relay stations for re-transmission. Those who have the technical know-how can receive these feeds with excellent quality. To be sure, these frequencies, too, could be jammed by the Soviet Union; but the Americans have other links available via cable or satellite so that the effort would not be worthwhile. In this connection, one should not forget that the operation of jamming transmitter systems is extremely costly. Estimates are that Moscow spends as much money on their upkeep alone as on its entire domestic broadcast operation which after all spans 14 time zones.

The Political Backdrop

As a rule, a change of government calls for certain procedures to be followed in the field of radio and television. The Polish military government quite clearly failed to live up to these procedures. To be sure, all regional radio stations were closed down on 13 December 1981 and all staff members were sent on furlough; the national radio programs were reduced to one as were the two television channels; the pop music broadcasts of the small boy scout station were terminated—but the external service "Radio Polonia" does not, as would be true to form, resort to airing domestic programs or to transmitting an endless program of patriotic or military music. The fact is that the frequencies were not used at all, which "Radio Canada International," VOA and other broadcasters soon discovered. "Radio Polonia" did not go back on the air until 22 December and has been broadcasting a stopgap program in German, English and Polish since.

At first, the introduction of total censorship and the news blackout had the desired effect. The West had nothing much with which to counter the official communiques except rumors, speculations and vague stories on the mood prevailing inside the country. But since the Warsaw military government was obviously interested in quickly conveying the image of normalization to the outside world, it decided to lift the most stringent restrictions on Western newsmen as time went by. In the meantime, they had availed themselves of the "brotherly" assistance of the Soviet Union. When the news blackout was relaxed the jamming activities began immediately. From the first day on, the Polish people could thus not be influenced by news from the outside.

Unmasking Soviet Goals

For decades now, producers and consumers on both sides of the iron curtain have lived with the reality that different social orders generate different forms of media news coverage. But the massive use of jamming against the "hate propaganda" of whatever the other side was seemed to decline in recent years. Most of all the Soviet Union was at pains to convey the impression in the aftermath of the Helsinki Conference that the methods of the Cold War were gone and forgotten—while setting up a more perfect jamming network in great secrecy just in case. It was probably no easy matter for the Kremlin bosses to divulge the existence of this jamming network concurrently with the Madrid followup session. But the aftereffects of the invasion of Afghanistan on Western news coverage and on the mood inside the Soviet Union itself led to the system's being activated prematurely in July 1980. And the Warsaw military leaders are now profiting from its reserve capacities.

9478
CSO: 2300/99

APPEAL TO HELP SICK NOTED

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 15 Dec 81 p 5

[Article by (l.o.): "Help the Sick! Appeal by the Minister of Health and Social Welfare"]

[Text] As we were informed by Dr Jerzy Lukowski, press spokesman for the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, (Minister) Tadeusz Szchachowski addressed an appeal to medical academy students and senior class students of medical secondary schools [premedical high schools]. The content of the appeal follows:

Colleagues! The situation in which we find ourselves demands that all health units continue to be an area for quite considerate work involvement on behalf of the ill. I appeal to you for the realization everywhere and at every moment of this imperative which is part of the vocation and social service that we mutually perform. No rationale or arguments can exist to justify any other conduct.

I appeal to you medical academy students and senior class students of medical secondary schools to apply to the nearest health service units where you live and engage in work there. Take advantage of the school break by becoming actively involved in taking care of the sick. Help your older colleagues in discharging their heavy and responsible obligations, and at the same time take advantage of the opportunity to improve your practical knowledge at the side of the sick. Feel yourselves to be health service workers.

This appeal is simultaneously a recommendation to managers of health service units to assure proper working conditions for you.

10433
CSO: 2600/181

STATUS OF FOOD DELIVERIES TO WARSAW CITY

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 15 Dec 81 p 8

[Article by Irena Szaczkuszowa and Marzena Wieczorek: "Deliveries of Food Articles--Just as Heretofore. Increased Purchases Make Supply More Difficult"]

[Text] Yesterday was an unusually strenuous day for Varsovians making purchases. It was possible to buy only sugar and flour without any difficulty in all stores for hours. There were special difficulties with buying bread, the first shipments of which disappeared from stores in the course of 2 early morning hours, despite the fact that bakery supplies were almost 100,000 loaves greater than every Monday, and transportation was operating properly. During that time bread was sold without any restrictions.

It Did Not Suffice for Everyone

People were buying three-four loaves--said Romana Marcewicz, manager of the store on Warecka Street. The 700 kilograms from the morning delivery and 60 kilograms of "Old Polish" leftover from last Friday sufficed for barely 1 hour. At 10
At 10 o'clock the shelves there as well as in other stores in the Soliborz housing areas Zatrasie, Piaski, Chomiczowka and in Srodmiescie stores on Rutkowskiego, Aleje Jerozolimskie, Bracka and Krakowskie Przedmiescie were empty.

Many persons were waiting for the second consignment of bakery products to the store at 30 Waszyngton street from 0800. It was not delivered until 1500.

That is the normal afternoon delivery time--we are told by Jadwiga Wlodarska, the manager of that unit--if it were brought earlier it likewise would not last long.

Because of customer demands only one loaf at a time was being sold in this store during the afternoon.

The purchase of other foodstuffs: dairy products, cereals, flour and even vegetables was greater than usual yesterday.

Here it needs to be added, that decisions were undertaken yesterday in the capital headquarters of the Warsaw Consumers' Cooperative (WSS) "Spolem" the administrator of the food trade which permit better supervision over trade activity under the difficult conditions linked with the lack of telephone

communications. All the officials were obligated to visit stores and make personal contacts with food producers. Round-the-clock duty schedules were instituted.

As we were advised by Cecylia Petrus, director of WSS "Spolem," in order to make it possible for residents to obtain food articles every day, and to slow down excessive purchasing, as of today, there will be limits on the amounts of purchases everywhere. For example, a customer will be able to purchase up to two loaves of bread, 5 kg of potatoes, and so on, at any one time.

Bakers Are Working Dedicatedly

We also visited Warsaw bakeries. Their staffs are working with great dedication. If it was necessary, they remained at their work posts until their replacements showed up. The trade ordered 52,000 loaves of bread from "Lowicka" bakery on Monday. By 1400 hours, 57,000 loaves were baked which were immediately distributed. During the afternoon, an additional 22,000 loaves were furnished.

According to Irena Liskiewicz, the manager of the "Belwederska" bakery, about 20,000 loaves of bread are baked during each of 3 shifts. The orders for Tuesday amount to 47,000 loaves, thus the bakers will see to it that more bread is made available than the trade ordered. When excessive purchases are restricted, bread ought to be available for sale at all times.

Bakers and trade also guarantee supplies of bread which assure the full satisfaction of needs. Hence, excessive purchasing is not warranted and simply leads to waste of bakery goods.

Normal Dairy Deliveries

We also took an interest yesterday in the production of milk and milk products. The chairman of the District Dairy Cooperative "Paraga," Boleslaw Ratajczyk, anticipates that production will be maintained at the present level although the raw material-fuel situation is not the best. This dairy supplies the capital and the capital voivodship portion with about 220,000 liters of milk, 8,000 liters of cream and 3,000 tons of cheese every day.

"Wola," Warsaw's largest dairy is also working without any disturbances. It furnishes stores with 200,000 liters of milk in bottles and 160,000 liters in foil cartons every day.

The capital received about 500,000 liters of milk from all of the milk plants (including the "Mokotow" milk plant) yesterday. Thus, if the present level of purchases is maintained, there should be no lack of this item.

Let us hope that with the initiation of close supervision over trade by "Spolem" employees, that the "intervention" supply problems arising because of the lack of phone service will not be as burdensome as they were the day before.

10433
CSO: 2600/181

PARTICIPANTS IN FIREFIGHTER SCHOOL STRIKE INTERVIEWED

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 19-20 Dec 81 p7

[Article by Ewa Fiala: "Eight of the 'First' Troops"]

> [Text] (Our own information) "It turned out that somebody wanted to use our hands to handle affairs that were not ours, not the affairs of officer candidates." These words came from the lips of one of the students at the former Higher Officers' Firefighting School (WOSP), who talked on the 18th of this month with a group of journalists at the Fire Brigade Headquarters.

Among these officer cadets are those from Warsaw, but they also came from Lodz, Lublin, and Radom, where they are now doing their service in the fire brigades. They hope soon to return to the student benches, but

"It is only now, on normal duty, that we get the flavor of it. In the practice sessions it was entirely different. A man was never "first," always in the reserves. They did not take us students for the action work."

One can create an exact notion of the course of events at WOSP from the talks with cadets Szwed, Tomal, Krzywda, Bartoszcze, Kononowicz, and Zulnowski, of how often and about what the commander and his assistant at the school talked to them, which of the civilian lecturers talked and about what, usually members of Solidarity; when delegates came to the school from the Independent Association of Students (NZS) and Mazowsze Region Solidarity, who called them, and when they came uninvited. And therefore how the strike was going. But that is already in the past, and besides that, the newspaper accounts have made the facts known. Nonetheless, they discuss them still from the beginning, giving details and supporting them with every minor little thing. Only one of the eight (two asked that their names not be revealed) does not know but what if he had it to do over again he would find himself back among those on strike. He says frankly: "I do not know if I could separate myself from my colleagues." But after a moment's reflection he adds: "I don't know

whether today there would be people who would decide on this form of protest, on this way of "correcting" the school, of making things right." They were unanimous: "No." It was not a question of the school. The lesson had been painful. We understood a lot.

This understanding leads to associating certain facts. The first fact: Suddenly a lively discussion began on the draft of the higher education law. The cadets were told that in the draft law none of the democratic rights given other institutions of higher education applied to the WOSP ("democratic" is what they call them). Second fact: The Solidarity bulletin board began having communiques and statements about the rigors to which WOSP graduates were to be subjected. There will be the obligation to work 12 years in the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW). The WOSP diploma (of engineer) will not be honored in other areas of the economy; outside of MSW we will be [considered] technicians. They also wrote about the regime which, contrary to the broad freedoms which the new law guarantees to other institutions of higher education, was to let them fall through a big gap.

Not everybody believed it. They asked the commander. He spoke truthfully! "I did not read the draft law," but he gave them his word that they would not be technicians wherever they worked. He spoke too truthfully. Besides, what was the word of one, two, or even several people, since one continually heard first in a whisper, then out loud, and finally in a shout: "Untrue."

No, nobody was acquainted with the draft law. They knew that it was not even the first reading in the Sejm. But those who said, "Untrue," said it suggestively. They were from here, from WOSP, from the Warsaw institutions of higher education, and from the Mazowsze Region Solidarity. They had the advantage of numbers. The statements often repeated began to be convincing.

"We thought that it was a question of the school, of us, and of those who would be the next classes of cadets. First of all, during the rally, and even during the first hours of the strike, it seemed as though it was only a matter of the school, of our affairs. Then things went further, and finally it stopped being the subject altogether.

Seweryn Jaworski's speech came as a shock. He said practically nothing about the school. He criticized the government, the political system. Everything became just about clear."

They said that they understood nearly everything. I did not write everything, and this was on purpose, deliberately so. If people who are so young recognized right away that they already know and understood everything, I would take it as incorrect, but it is important that they are already figuring out that the game was not for the stakes that were originally listed at the top of the demands. It is important that they have their opinion of the school, that, believing that they will continue their studies in the vocation of their choice, they are heatedly dis-

cussing, in a language only they understand, using verbal shorthand, the curriculum, the classes, the practice courses, and life at Jelonki (the barracks), discussing the fact that many of them are outside Warsaw, that they must somehow be integrated with the city, have conditions created to participate in culture.

In the capital of the country, which was in a state of war, we talked with people who had participated in the noisy demonstrations of a few days before. Is it bad that they speak and think about tomorrow? Is it a bad thing that by the law of youth they want a better tomorrow? It is a good thing that it seems so close to them.

Out of 364 student-cadets at the former WOSP, 229 reported and took up duties at the brigade headquarters. They are serving as part of the "first troops" today, for tomorrow.

10790
CSO: 2600/184

MEETING OF COMMITTEE FOR CHILDREN REPORTED

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 22 Dec 81 p 2

[Article: "Concrete Decisions for the Good of the Youngest"]

> [Text] A meeting of the Committee for Children and representatives of certain institutions and social organizations, held in Warsaw on December 21, 1981, was devoted to the most important problems now affecting the youngest generation. The meeting, which was attended by Lt Col Miroslaw Hermaszewski, member of the Military Council for National Salvation (WRON) was conducted by Wojciech Zukrowski, chairman of the Committee.

During a two-months' period of activity, the Committee for Children undertook a number of important actions. It obtained agreement from the authorities to supply children up to age 4 in the cities with milk containing a higher content of fat. Thus, as of January 1, 1982, milk containing 3.2 percent butterfat will reach children in the largest urban centers, and as of February 1, 1982, in all Polish towns.

In the opinion of the committee members, the production of carbon tetrachloride for diapers must be increased immediately, and full coverage of rationed items of sanitation on card "O" be guaranteed. It is proposed that the allotment of sanitary goods [diapers, etc.] be extended to cover children up to age 3.

The Committee activists proposed that all surpluses of paper and production capacity be assigning for the printing of books for children.

Consideration was given during the discussion on how children can be protected from afflictions which arise during a state of martial law. Aside from ensuring children and youth proper nourishment, the most important problem is organizing their free time. The interruption in school lessons, which, in the opinion of the representatives of the Ministry of Education and Upbringing was indispensable, has meant that some pupils are now not being cared for. Young people, not knowing what to do with free time, are susceptible to all kinds of manipulation and can easily become a tool in the hands of forces working against the authorities and may come into conflict with the law. /That is why it is the duty of every institution and organization involved in affairs of the young generation, without looking to the army, to develop and implement its own initiatives/ [in boldface].

Lt Col M. Hermaszewski gave assurance that activities whose goal is the good of the children can count on all kinds of help from the Military Council for National Salvation (WRON) and the military commissioners. The military can assist in organizing polytechnical lessons for youth, in conducting the nourishment programs in the schools, and in printing lesson materials for teachers. But the Council will not act as a substitute for organizations that are responsible for bringing up the young generation. Emergency initiatives are critically needed, but they must be treated in combination with long-range measures.

9295
CSO: 2600/185

BRIEFS

SITUATION IN MEDICAL ACADEMIES--A conference of rectors, military studies directors and PZPR school committee secretaries from 10 medical academies from around the entire country took place in Warsaw on 6 January. The conference, whose participants included Minister of Health and Social Welfare Tadeusz Szelachowski, and the commissioner of that ministry, National Defense Committee plenipotentiary Brig Gen Prof Jerzy Bonczak, was devoted to discussion of the current problems concerning the functioning of medical schools and, against this background, to an evaluation of the possibility of beginning instruction at these schools as soon as possible. It was stated that in principle all medical academies in the country are prepared to begin instruction on 18 January, albeit in somewhat limited scope at first. The eventual commencement of student studies on that date will be preceded by the instruction of school directorial and teaching cadres on the rights and duties of students and employees during the "state of war." Initial student activities will also be devoted to these matters. Individuals who do not conform to the "state of war" requirements should expect severe sanctions, including dismissal from studies. The minister of health and social welfare announced that he would approach the premier with the recommendation that instruction begin on 18 January. [Text] [Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 7 Jan 82 p 5]

YOUTH UNION FACTORY MEETING--At the invitation of its ZSMP [Union of Socialist Polish Youth] members, the work force of the Warsaw Mechanical Works "Wuzetem" [i.e., WZM] on Czerniakowska Street was visited by Lt Col Pilot Miroslaw Hermaszewski, a member of the Military Council for National Salvation, and Jerzy Jaskiernia, chairman of the ZSMP Main Board. The chief director of the factory, Jozef Arminski, expressed his sincere appreciation for the attitude of the predominantly young work force and asserted that it has been and is still possible to rely on the ZSMP members and on their initiative and devotion. In the conversation and discussion at the meeting there arose questions concerning i.a. the need for modification of the directions and form of ZSMP work. In particular, these questions concerned the efficient resolution of everyday social problems, aid in organizing the supply of provisions for the work force, greater initiative in housing affairs, etc. Questions of broadly conceived egalitarianism and equitable division of material goods were a constant theme in the discussions. These topics were covered i.a. within the context of credits for young married couples, credits which in recent months have been illusory due to the lack of a sufficient supply of goods. [Excerpts] [Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 7 Jan 82 p 2]

NEED TO WORK--We have come to live in a state of war introduced in a situation of economic ruin and dangers for the country, when the problem becomes the assurance of daily bread and queues of distressed people stand in the cold for various articles essential for life. Long winter months and the specter of empty stores are before us, as are empty ports in which there is nothing to transship. An awareness that only work offers us the opportunity for emerging from poverty is something new. However, the realization of this truth was impossible under conditions of constant conflicts and an atmosphere strained to the limits of endurance. Now we must help ourselves and the only way out is work. Increased effort which can yield a larger quantity of goods, those earmarked for stores and those for export for which, among other things, we would be able to buy food and medicines, is an obligation toward one's family and closest friends as well as the state. At the same time, we await better distribution of goods. That also depends on people working in trade and transport. If there are millions of people standing in queues every day for bread, milk and whatever can still be bought, instead of being at work, that not only is a waste of health and energy but also of our work. Work on which our well being is dependent. [Text] [Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish No 294, 15 Dec 81 p 2] 10433

PHYSICAL EDUCATION, SPORTS--Current problems of youth physical education and sports were discussed at a joint meeting of Ministry of Education and Upbringing and the Main Committee for Physical Culture and Sports managements on the 14th of this month. These problems were the subject of discussions undertaken in various physical education teacher and activist centers, as well as during the little Diet of Physical Culture. [Text] [Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish No 294, 15 Dec 81 p 5] 10433

SCHOOL LAW--As reported by deputy Henryk Rafalski, chairman of the Sejm Commission on Health and Physical Culture, the Commission has begun to formulate opinions pertaining to a draft law on higher schooling. The problems relating to medical schooling and physical culture have not been given sufficient attention in this document. On the 14th of this month a discussion in the Commission was devoted specifically to these matters. The object was to ensure cohesiveness in the powers that the plan provides for the Main Council on Higher Schools, the senates of the higher schools, the rectors and the minister. [Text] [Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 15 Dec 81 p 2] 9295

SCOUT UNION CHILD CARE--On 15 December 1981, the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Scout Union (ZHP) issued a special order which specifically instructs the organization's members to conduct lessons with children and youth as part of the scout preparedness for winter. /Each instructor is required to organize interesting and safe work for the patrols and troops/ [in boldface]. The ZHP instructors will establish "close contact with parents so that they may be certain that their child is properly cared for while attending scout activities. The scouts and the instructors, both in their assemblies and while on duty, will be in uniform and will wear the scout headgear," the order reads. During martial law, persons with full authority to act will be sent by the ZHP Headquarters to council commands to help in the efficient organization of scout work. The full text of the special order from the ZHP commander-in-chief was disseminated through organizational channels. [Text] [Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 17 Dec 81 p 2] 9295

RURAL YOUTH UNION MEETING--On 19 December 1981 in Warsaw, Waldemar Swirgon, chairman of the National Board of the Rural Youth Union (ZMW) conducted a meeting of the chairman of the ZMW Voivodship Boards (ZW). The forms and methods of the work of the ZMW circles and echelons in the new situation were discussed. The ZMW aktiv accepted the decision to declare a state of martial law with solemnity and understanding. [Text] [Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 21 Dec 81 p 5] 9295

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/Article by V. Liveanu: "The Nature of the Antonescu Regime"/

/Text/ So far from disappearing, interest in the study of fascism has been growing in the 36 years since the end of World War II, in the effort to reconsider and survey an immense human tragedy in the light of the past decades. The international development of the studies of fascism also involves confrontations among various schools of contemporary social thought, including the effort to rightly answer those who are trying to restore or revive some or others of the fascist practices and ideas.

The term "fascism" first appeared as a designation of the Italian party headed by Mussolini and then, as Prof Iorgu Iordan said back in 1934, its primary meaning was extended to new shades of meaning designating political trends in various countries ("Political Articles," Bucharest 1979, p 52). Therefore the parties and dictatorships called "fascist" (a term that rightly became infamous in the eyes of men worthy of the name) naturally had traits peculiar to each country in addition to their general characteristics. Accordingly the studies made in recent years, in making the necessary distinction between fascist dictatorships and those "of the traditional type," also note the importance of special study of the fascism in each separate country and the existence of varieties of fascism other than the German or Italian "classic fascism" that are indicated by designations like "military fascism," "clerical fascism," "agrarian fascism" etc. Marxist historians in Romania took an early interest in the distinctive characteristics of each of the successive dictatorships in Romania between 1938 and 1944. In his work "Under Three Dictatorships" written in 1941 L. Patrascanu called the royal dictatorship a reactionary dictatorship characterized by the king's personal power, without calling it fascist. In L. Patrascanu's view the Iron Guard movement, "a kind of fascist movement," was in power during the "Antonescu-Iron Guard dictatorship." In the same work and also in his work "Basic Problems of Romania" written in 1942-1943, L. Patrascanu characterized the dictatorship established by Ion Antonescu after the Iron Guard was expelled from the government as a "military-fascist dictatorship." In both works L. Patrascanu called the regime established in January 1941 "the military dictatorship" or "the Antonescu dictatorship" without considering the contradiction between those terms and the characterization of the regime as a military-fascist dictatorship. The judgments in L. Patrascanu's naturally coincided with those of the RCP. The RCP documents still characterize the Antonescu regime after January 1941 as a military-fascist dictatorship even today.

Recent works have enriched the subject matter of research on Antonescu's regime, bringing up many interesting aspects that were previously little studied or not at all and circulating new sources that call attention to important historical problems requiring clarification. Solution of the complex problems of this period actually requires not only citation of the historical sources but also their comparison and critical analysis, especially the documents wherein the Antonescian dignitaries tried to justify their activity both before and after 23 August 1944. Uncritical acceptance of the documents, arbitrary selections and distorted quotations lead to leaps from one bias to another, including conclusions that appear sensational but are actually anachronistic not only because they disagree with historical reality but also because they agree on the light in which the Antonescian leaders wished to appear in the eyes of the public and in the judgments of history.

We do not intend to discuss in this article the question of characterizing Antonescu's regime in its entirety. We shall confine ourself to indicating a few points of reference for relating Antonescu's regime to the other fascist regimes and for determining that regime's stand on the problems of relations with Hitlerite Germany.

As contrasted with those who see in fascism a kind of state possible in the most diverse social systems, the Marxist researchers, and not they alone, point out the genetic tie between capitalism and fascism. As Max Horkheimer, the noted representative of the Frankfurt School, commented back in 1939, "Who does not want to speak of capitalism must also keep silent about fascism," and a work of the West German researcher R. Kuehnl stated that the fascist dictatorship is one of "the forms of the bourgeois state" (1).

One of the first points we wish to stress is that the problem of the nature of Antonescu's regime is not identical with that of the stage of development of capitalism in Romania. The restructuring of the old order, which fascism wished to accomplish by terror and social demagoguery, was actually intended for consolidation of private property and social exploitation. But in contrast with the implications of the old formula to the effect that fascism everywhere necessarily reflected the most reactionary extremes of monopolist capital, regimes or movements regarded as fascist existed not only in countries where capitalism had been transformed into monopolist capitalism long before (in Germany for example) but also in capitalist countries where monopolist capital was still in a quite incipient stage (Spain, Bulgaria or Estonia). I do not think one can speak of a fascist dictatorship in any capitalist countries, but only in those that have already undergone a bourgeois parliamentary regime against which fascism has risen. Furthermore one can speak of a fascist dictatorship only in a certain historical stage, namely the one in which the socialist revolutions have taken place which it is one of the purposes of fascism to avoid. Some have even formed the opinion, which we share, that it is necessary to distinguish between fascism and neofascism, the former being characteristic of the 1919-1945 period alone.

Since the predominance of capitalist relations in Romania between the wars and the existence in 1919-1938 of the parliamentary system based on universal suffrage (with its omissions and limitations to be sure) cannot be questioned, we shall concentrate upon the political system between January 1941 and 23 August 1944. I feel the description, at times, of Antonescu's regime only as a regime of the right is not wrong in itself but inadequate. Any fascist regime is a regime of the right, but not every regime of the right in the 1919-1945 period was a fascist one. Not every rightist bourgeois regime in that period openly and completely suppressed any civil rights and

any trace of the representative system while intensifying the terror against the labor movement and any democratic trend, as it happened in the period of Antonescu's dictatorship.

The form of government in the period, or the form taken by the bourgeois state, is essential to the description of Antonescu's regime. The decrees of 5-8 September 1940, which suspended the 1938 Constitution, dissolved the parliament elected in 1939 and transferred all state powers to Gen Ion Antonescu, and the decree of 9 September 1940 whereby Ion Antonescu proclaimed himself chief of the Romanian state were the legal basis for the state regime in that period. It was a backward step both from the bourgeois parliamentary regime before 1938 and from the situation during the royal dictatorship.

The Constitution of February 1938 instituted a regime of the monarch's personal power, yet it proclaimed observance of civil rights and freedoms and maintenance of a parliament that lacked real power but permitted some public activity of the left and the antifascist trends, especially during elections. Workers trade organizations existed (guilds), although they were under the wing of the Ministry of Labor. Some anti-Hitlerite public assemblies and demonstration were permitted, without repression by the authorities. In the summer of 1940 the royal dictatorship was oriented toward Hitlerite Germany externally and took steps toward totalitarianism internally, but it was not until Antonescu's dictatorship was established that all civil rights and freedoms and all traces of parliamentary government were openly suppressed. The farcical plebiscites by open ballot staged by Antonescu's regime had nothing in common with parliamentary government but followed the models of the plebiscites organized by the fascist regimes in other countries. The law itself abolished any legal restriction and any form of check on the "leader" Antonescu's arbitrary exercise of all state powers, creating a legal framework wherein the terror against the labor movement, all democratic factions and trends, and all those the authorities considered dangerous to the regime was intensified by new repressive laws, by numerous sentences to imprisonment and death, and by deportations and internments in camps.

A state administration monopolized by one ultrareactionary faction or another of the representatives of the bourgeoisie, complete and open abolition of the democratic freedoms, human rights and the parliamentary system, transfer of the mass communication media to the complete control of the bourgeois state, legal concentration of that state's power in the hands of one person alone, maximum intensification of repressive measures, and violence to all organizations and persons opposing the state administration, all those traits characteristic of fascist dictatorships were also characteristic of Antonescu's dictatorship.

Priority on anticommunism and anti-Marxism and their use to justify the dictatorship are traits common to all fascist dictatorships, although not to them alone. All governments in the 1921-1940 period followed a repressive anticommunist policy, but never before did the terror against the labor movement go to the extremes it did in Romania during Antonescu's dictatorship.

Antonescu's regime preserved the form of a monarchic state. From January 1941 until Antonescu's arrest, the prerogatives reserved for the king, including command of the army or appointment of the prime minister, were merely symbolic formalities. Throughout Antonescu's dictatorship the whole power to decide matters of national government was in the hands of the "state leader," the situation being similar to the one in fascist Italy until July 1943.

It is well known that in the period from January 1941 to 23 August 1944 Antonescu's dictatorship differed from the fascist regimes in Germany and Italy in that it was not based on a fascist party of its own but was in conflict with the Iron Guard, the main fascist organization in Romania. It is absolutely necessary to analyze this conflict in order to correct the description of Antonescu's regime.

The fascist parties and groups served to intensify the role of political power in the bourgeois order, and the holders and beneficiaries of the power wished to be sole owners of the means of influencing and controlling society, the social prestige, or the material advantages. The conflict between Gen Ion Antonescu and the Iron Guard leadership originated in the struggle for supremacy in the state administration. The Iron Guardists thought the predominant role in the exercise of the dictatorship belonged to the Iron Guard and its paramilitary units. Their terror and plunder involved not only the fanaticism of violence and crime, bestial chauvinism and the fascist mystique of primitive, instinctive sensations and adventure but especially the tendencies of the Iron Guard's social affiliation.

Coming largely from the ranks of those dissatisfied with their position in the society of the time (They came from the petty bourgeoisie, the declassed strata, the newcomers to the city who had not found jobs, or the families of the former, more or less decadent aristocracy), the Iron Guardists did not wish to change the old order but on the contrary to preserve it by violence, while imposing upon it, also by violence, a new hierarchy that would raise them in the social scale and make them "the leading elite of the nation." The Iron Guard chiefs, who spared no appeals to honor and "life in poverty," organized or encouraged the criminal actions of their followers in order to intimidate all strata of the population and to secure their monopoly of the government. Those actions even struck and frightened some bourgeois circles that had previously supported the Iron Guard movement as a diversion against the labor movement and the progressive movements in general.

Gen Antonescu, convinced in his megalomania that the very existence of the Romanian state depended upon concentration of power in his hands, trusted in his struggle for power to his old ties with the army, to the rightist circles of the bourgeoisie and, in general, to the "traditional" hegemony of the ruling classes, and also to the general desire to put a stop to the Iron Guard's pillage and violent crimes. The "leader of the state" put down the Iron Guard's rebellion, expelled Iron Guardists from the government, prohibited their activity, and sent many of them to prison and concentration camps and some of them to the firing squad. But alongside these measures he yielded to the Hitlerite troops and services in Romania, who transported the main Iron Guard leaders to Germany and maintained contacts with the Iron Guardists remaining in Romania. Meanwhile Antonescu left some Iron Guardist groups at liberty and confined himself to keeping a close watch on their activity, because the hands of Antonescu's government were tied by adherence to Hitlerite Germany's policy and by loyalty to the camp to which the Iron Guardists also belonged.

And as we know the Iron Guardists, encouraged by some German circles connected with the SS, hoped to receive Hitler's supreme support when they started the rebellion. But Hitler agreed, on the advice of the Wehrmacht commanders and the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that Antonescu should crush the Iron Guardist rebellion. After the rebellion, when Antonescu rejected the reconciliation with the Iron Guard suggested through Killinger, Hitler again gave the advantage to the "state leader" and the German minister in Bucharest made several public declarations urging the Iron

Guardists to support the existing regime. As we know, Hitler's support of the "state leader" was the outcome of a realistic calculation: Gen Antonescu was more useful to Nazi Germany than the Iron Guardists because he could more readily secure maximum participation of the Romanian army and economy in support of the Hitlerite war because of his connections with the army and with the old leading circles of the nation. Throughout the whole period up to 23 August 1944 Hitler retained his confidence in Gen Antonescu and did not resort to the police "reserve facility" that he maintained in Germany because Antonescu's regime better served the interests of German fascist imperialism.

To appreciate the real significance of the conflict between Ion Antonescu and the Iron Guard, one must not view it "in itself" or in isolation but in the context of the positions in which the two rivals were. So far from making a 180-degree turn in his political policy, as desired and hoped for by so many of those who welcomed the expulsion of the Iron Guard from the government and the repression of the rebellion in January 1941, Antonescu went on to declare himself as well as the Iron Guardists supporters of the totalitarian state and he maintained the totalitarian regime in practice. Like the Iron Guardists, Antonescu's regime entertained and carried out a policy tied to Hitlerite Germany and proclaimed its unconditional ideological solidarity with the "Fascist Axis." As the Iron Guardists wished, Antonescu's regime joined the anti-Soviet war, increased the economic contribution to the German war effort, and took steps to strengthen the positions of German capital in the Romanian economy. After the defeat of the Iron Guard rebellion it actually put a stop to the assassinations of anti-Iron Guard politicians as well as the Iron Guardists' plunder and anarchic actions, but it also intensified the terror against the democratic and labor movements and adopted new racist laws and measures.

Of course it is to be assumed that an Iron Guard dictatorship would have committed more monstrous crimes than those of Antonescu's dictatorship (including those against some bourgeois politicians of the intelligentsia) and would have pursued a worse domestic policy than Antonescu's, so that the difference between the various varieties of fascism would have appeared in a way most disastrous to the nation, but not the difference between fascism and its opponents. Serious as the repressions and crimes of Italian fascism were, they did not attain the apocalyptic proportions of the repressions and crimes of the German Nazism that the Iron Guardists took as a model. But no one disputes the fascist character of Mussolini's regime for that reason.

After January 1941 Antonescu's regime differed from that of Hitler, Mussolini or Franco in the absence of a fascist party of its own. We say "of its own" because the legal activity that was nevertheless conducted under this regime by a fascist party is not to be overlooked. Actually Antonescu's regime, which made so much of "the creed of complete nationalism," permitted the legal existence of one party alone, the German National-Socialist Party, whose Romanian section comprised Romanian citizens of German origin. With the consent of Antonescu's regime, the Romanian section of the Nazi Party, which was directly under Berlin, had its own military units and espionage services and recruited Romanian citizens for the SS detachments. After January 1941 the Nazi Party administration continued to collaborate with Iron Guardist groups, had agents on the state staff, and freely propagated fascist ideas and practices in all political life.

It is true that Antonescu's regime did not found another party to replace the Iron Guard. Most of the members of the new government formed in January 1941 were generals. Later on the civilians in Antonescu's government came to outnumber the military.

But the powers of the state continued to be concentrated in the hands of General (later Marshal) Ion Antonescu. He assigned the function a fascist party would have performed, that of maintaining the totalitarian dictatorship, to the army and the repressive organization. It is known from the accounts of those close to him, brought to light by historians, that Antonescu acknowledged that he shared in the concept of "the police state" (2). At a conference of military commanders in February 1944 he was even more clear: "I have no party. My party is the army" (3). The events on 23 August 1944 were to dispel that illusion.

One more fact should be noted. In the government program published in November 1941, after he had proclaimed the military organization "the very purpose of our national existence" and expressed his decision not to found a party of his own, Antonescu announced his intention to gradually give the state a corporate organization including a state council (of a consultative nature, it was implied) and to found a whole series of other organizations in addition to the corporate organizations. The real function of these organizations would have been to bring all categories of the population under the control of the state headed by Antonescu.

The political basis of Antonescu's regime was that provided not by a political party but by the state leader's real qualification as a general, by his alleged qualification as representative of the army, and by his ability, due to military discipline, to control the army and through it the whole state organization. Control was exercised either directly by Antonescu or by the generals and colonels he appointed for longer or shorter periods to key posts ordinarily entrusted to civilians before 1941. Antonescu's intrument of government was not party discipline but military discipline, which he tried to extend over the entire population by various laws and organizational forms. This characteristic, wherein Antonescu's regime differed from the traditional fascist regimes, justifies its description as a particular variety of fascism, namely a military-fascist dictatorship.

The racist policy was a trait common to Antonescu's regime and the fascist regimes in Germany and many countries. On the one hand, since the Germans were declared a superior race the so-called "German ethnic group" was recognized as a special privileged status from state to state, but it also placed the Romanian citizens of German origin under the control of the Nazi services in Romania. On the other hand, the government kept up a violent chauvinist agitation, blaming the Jews and other national minorities for all the ills from which the Romanian nation was suffering. The diversionist agitation was encouraged by the anti-Semitic legislation, which excluded Jews from public institutions, required dismissal of many of them from private enterprises, prohibited or restricted their performance of the intellectual professions, prohibited them from residing outside of a limited number of communities, excluded them from all state schools, and did not recognize the diplomas issued by the schools for Jews that were left in operation. The measures for so-called "Romanianization" of the real property, capital and personnel of the enterprises and the various professions were intended to create a stratum of beneficiaries and supporters of the regime. After the outbreak of the anti-Soviet war Antonescu's regime deported a great many Jews and Gypsies to Transnistria , which deportations led to tens of thousands of deaths from maltreatment, executions, starvation and epidemics. Upon receiving a memo to the effect that deportation actually meant homicide, Antonescu placed a reply in the newspapers for 27 October 1941 which, according to L. Patrascanu, "was a direct incitement to a pogrom" (4). It is also known that Mihai Antonescu, a deputy and spokesman of the "state leader's," declared in a meeting of the Council of Ministers on 8 July

1941, "I do not care whether we shall go down in history as barbarians," and he advised, "Use a machine gun if necessary" (5).

But it is true that the horrors did not reach the proportions they did in Hitlerite Germany or in other occupied countries or satellites. But this was no thanks to Antonescu and those who exercised the military-fascist dictatorship under his leadership. The Romanian people's direct and indirect resistance and their profound sense of humanity mitigated some of Antonescu's regime's odious measures and even made them unenforceable, and they compelled the "state leader" to refrain from adopting some radical measures, especially when it became evident that Germany could not win the war. But this historical fact can in no way justify the opinion of some that Antonescu's regime was not a fascist one. Anti-Semitism was not inherent in all fascist regimes (for example, the one in Spain or the one in Italy before the consolidation of its alliance with Hitler) or in all of Germany's allies (Finland for example). Deprivation of its own people of any democratic rights was essential to a fascist regime, as well as an outbreak of terrorist measures against "its own" nation in order to maintain the old social order, and those very traits were common to Antonescu's regime and the other fascist regimes.

Antonescu's regime, as well as the other fascist ones, combined intensified exploitation of the masses, terrorist methods, chauvinism and demagogy concerning the so-called "national revolution" with social demagogy and promises to implement "social justice" and to improve the condition of the workers and peasants. The limited space of this article does not permit us to discuss this problem. But we mention that the conditions characteristic of the capitalist system and the measures of Antonescu's government naturally helped to shift the economic burdens of the war upon the backs of the working masses.

To support the Hitlerite war and meet Nazi Germany's demands at the economy's expense, Antonescu's regime intensified the state's intervention in the economy. In 1942-1943 offices were founded by law in a number of major industrial sectors which were actually compulsory capitalist syndicates and in which the representatives of the big private enterprises were accorded the function of purchasing and distributing the raw materials and selling the finished products. Through the offices the state distributed the raw materials, credits and orders to meet the economic needs of the war and to secure the capitalist profits. A banking law of March 1943 facilitated concentration of bank capital. State monopolist capital was not developed under Antonescu's regime as far as in Nazi Germany because monopolist capitalism itself was not developed as far in Romania as it was in Germany. Nor in other countries with fascist regimes were state intervention in the economy and state monopolist capitalism developed as far as they were in the Hitlerite Reich.

Antonescu's dictatorship was characterized by the critical part played in its establishment and maintenance by the direct support of Hitlerite Germany. Until the summer of 1940 the reactionary bourgeois circles banking on the ultimate victory of the fascist states and siding with Germany and Italy without reservations were in the minority of the ruling classes and had not succeeded in gaining the decisive influence in the state administration through their own forces. After the defeat of France in May 1940 many rightist politicians, officials and generals who had previously taken Francophile and Anglophile stands sided with Germany from then on. These included Gen Antonescu who, as distinguished from others, had already shown sympathy with the Iron Guardists in the prewar years. On 9 July 1940 the German minister in Romania reported to Berlin that Gen Antonescu had been on France's side until recently but

was "close to the Guard" and "assured me during a longer visit that he wishes to work with Germany " (6).

As he repeatedly stated, Gen Antonescu concluded that after the disappearance of the French military power from the continent the Romanian government had to choose between rapprochement with communist Russia or with Germany, and he opted for Germany. He himself declared in the Council of Ministers that in the summer of 1940, when he was in compulsory residence in Bistrita Monastery in Oltenia, "I negotiated with Germany on all problems of the state government, through Mr Mihai Antonescu but in secret" (7).

Convinced of the Messianic role he had been accorded to save the Romanian state from "Bolshevism" by a close alliance with Hitlerite Germany, Gen Antonescu objectively became the exponent of the most reactionary narrow circles of the bourgeoisie and landowners.

In the tragic days at the beginning of September 1940, powerful popular movements were developing in Romania against the Dictate of Vienna, whereby Hitlerite Germany and fascist Italy had torn northern Transylvania from the body of Romania. Many generals and higher officers were inspired by the desire to resist and not to withdraw the Romanian troops before the Horthyite troops. But as the Axis ministers in Romania reported, Gen Antonescu favored and acted for enforcement of the odious dictate, for cession of northern Transylvania to Horthyite Hungary. (8)

One of the reasons why King Carol appointed Antonescu prime minister on 4 September was that he knew Hitlerite Germany liked him.

On the same day the German minister in Bucharest announced to Berlin, "In agreement with my Italian colleague (the Italian minister) and because only the general's strong hand and a quick decision can save the country from chaos (indicating fear of the revolt aroused among the people by the Dictate of Vienna -- our note), I advised Gen Antonescu to assume his dictatorial rights" (9). The German minister did not stop at advice but suggested directly to King Carol that he turn over the power to Antonescu and leave the country, and he reported with satisfaction that Gen Antonescu "will restore order and effect arbitration in Vienna according to the program. He honors the request to send the military mission and wishes the closest collaboration with Germany... I think we have found in his person a man at the head of the Romanian government who is determined to carry out our important requests here" (10).

Actually in his capacity of state "leader" Antonescu conformed without reservations to the fascist Axis policy, concluded economic agreements that placed the national econory in the service of the Hitlerite war effort, brought German troops into Romania, and made it easy for them to cross the Danube against Yugoslavia and Greece. Then he joined the anti-Soviet war and placed the country in a state of war against England and the United States.

The main forces of the bourgeoisie, including Maniu and Bratianu, leaders of the national-peasant and national-liberal parties, supported Antonescu's government, especially in the initial stage of the anti-Soviet war, in order to defend the social order and prevent the return of the Iron Guardists to the government. L. Patrascanu commented that the Antonescu government had tried to make a platform of "defense of the common interests of the whole ruling class in Romania." But he also quite rightly said that we must make certain distinctions between the active element of the

bourgeoisie, represented by its top reactionaries won over to collaboration with the Nazi Reich, and the rest of the bourgeoisie, who still had reservations. Without that distinction the policy of the single national front adopted by the RCP would have been aimless.

The leaders of the PNT and PNL [National Peasants Party and National Liberal Party] and especially Maniu and Bratianu, criticizing totalitarianism and unconditional adherence to the Axis but wishing to prevent uprising of the masses to independent action and development of revolutionary movements, saw in Antonescu's regime a suitable solution in the period of Germany's military predominance. They expected that when Germany was defeated the Anglo-American presence in Romania would be reestablished and they would restore the political system before 1938 with that support. Until then they considered it preferable to keep Antonescu at the head of the country because he enjoyed the confidence of Hitler, whose troops were in Romania.

Antonescu's regime could be maintained only with Germany's military and political support. This does not mean that Antonescu was a simple and faithful "follower of orders" but he tried to safeguard the positions of the Romanian ruling classes and certain interests of the economy and state they controlled. He satisfied Hitlerite Germany's essential interests as regards participation of the Romanian army in the anti-Soviet war and normal provision for the production and transportation essential to the front and the deliveries of petroleum, agricultural products and raw materials. But no matter how many troops, products and services his government made available to Germany, the Hitlerites were not satisfied and demanded more. The point was reached where the "state leader" himself, especially after the war took the course unfavorable to the fascist bloc, opposed some of Germany's exorbitant demands, demands that were often practically impossible to meet. Accordingly relations between the Antonescian and Hitlerite governments were not without undulations, contradictions and moments of discord.

But some authors' tendencies to conclude that Ionescu and his government put up any "resistance" to the subordination of the Romanian economy by Germany are groundless. In the course of the negotiations with Germany, Antonescu's government finished by contenting itself with some secondary concessions from the Hitlerites while satisfying their main and urgent demands. It was not by chance that Hitler kept his confidence in Antonescu throughout the period from January 1941 to 23 August 1944. That confidence was not groundless but reflected Antonescu's fulfillment of what was essential in the German demands. Even Antonescu's repeated secret approaches to the German representatives to regain northern Transylvania did not disturb Hitlerite Germany, which used the Dictate of Vienna to foment dissension among the satellite governments in order to keep them under its own thumb.

The fact that Antonescu tried to impose the interests of his own regime in his relations with Hitlerite Germany by no means attenuates but, on the contrary, makes even more clear his grave responsibility for his choice of the Axis policy, the Hitlerite war, and "loyalty" to the Reich. He bears the heavy responsibility for involving Romania in a situation that could only make it a "minor partner" enfeoffed but also plundered by Hitlerite Germany.

Antonescu's government did not conceal its concern for the interests of big Romanian capital in its economic negotiations with Germany.

In recounting to the Council of Ministers his visit to Hitler's headquarters with the "state leader" on 10-11 January 1943, Mihai Antonescu said he explained his request

that Germany pay for part of the Romanian deliveries in gold on the ground that the National Bank was "in regard to its structure in the position of a joint stock company, which has to cover any financial activity, balance or order resulting from a reserve for its stockholders." While in matters of economic relations with Germany Antonescu's government protected the reserves of the banks and joint stock companies, in matters of military relations, in which there was no question "but" the fate of the Romanian army and the lives of the soldiers, it did not prove very "considerate," especially in the first years of the Wehrmacht's successes.

In the middle of October 1941, after the great losses that were sustained, most of the Romanian troops were withdrawn to Romania. But in 1942, in the face of some generals' opposition, Antonescu sent great numbers to the front again, where they suffered catastrophic losses.

In a letter of 25 October 1943, the nuances of which some authors do not invariably present adequately, Hitler expressed his agreement with Marshal Ion Antonescu's intention to rejoin combat with all forces in the spring of 1944 after training and arming the new divisions, and he asked the marshal to consider the possibilities of sending every available unit to the front immediately (11).

It is significant that Antonescu replied to him, after the defeats suffered by the Axis, that he had no new units for the front because Germany had not yet sent enough war materiel, and he requested increased German deliveries of armaments. In the spring of 1944 Antonescu sent new divisions to the front, despite the losses suffered meanwhile in the Crimea, and in August 1944 the number of large units at the front reached 36 (12).

It is true that in November 1941, when the front had receded, Antonescu requested the withdrawal of the German troops in Romania in order to avoid the expense of maintaining them further, but that does not in the least change the fact that he promised to participate further in the Hitlerite war at a meeting with Hitler on 12 February 1942. As the German record of the conversation (incorrectly translated in some works) indicates, when Hitler expressed his intention to withdraw from Romania the German troops he needed at the front, Antonescu (we quote from the record) "protested slightly" and made objections "not much against the presence of the (German) troops and as much as possible against the disorder that had appeared in certain purchases by the German military authorities. He accordingly requested that both the economic organizations and the military services be subject to the (German) legation's control and pointed out in that connection that Herr von Killinger had accurate information" (13).

That was Antonescu's "resistance." It was confined to the request that all German purchases in Romania be subject to Baron Manfred von Killinger's control.

In his letter to Hitler of 15 November 1943, Antonescu expressed his satisfaction because Hitler, trusting in his Romanian ally, did not consider it necessary to increase the German troops in Romania (14), which implied maintenance of the existing troops, and in August 1944, when there were already 600,000 Hitlerite soldiers in Romania, Ion and Mihai Antonescu expressed their dissatisfaction with the transfer of some German divisions from Romania to other fronts, and they requested that some new new units be brought into Romania, especially tank units.

It is true that Antonescu's government did not agree to pay all the sums demanded by the Hitlerites for maintenance of the German troops in Romania. Some works mention

this point, but they neglect to say that Antonescu's government paid 64,169,000,000 lei for the maintenance of those troops, which sum proved insufficient to cover the current needs of the German army because it was also used to buy up some Romanian enterprises.

The documents on Romanian-German economic relations in 1941-1944, sometimes arbitrarily and not impartially selected, indicate that Antonescu's regime did not entirely meet Germany's excessive economic demands, but throughout its whole existence it accepted a system of deliveries, prices and payments whereby Romania supplied goods and services worth considerably more than the deliveries and payments made by Germany. In general the Romanian economists evaluate the economic damage done to Romania in this way at 62,459,000,000 lei at the rate of exchange in 1938. According to other data, the economic and military damage done by Germany to Romania is much greater.

In the first period of temporary military victories, Antonescu's regime did all it could to support the war against the anti-Hitlerite coalition. In his conversation with Hitler on 11 February 1942, Antonescu made the following statement, omitted in some works that refer to this conversation: "Romania is at the disposal of the Reich with all its military and economic potentials. If the war should last longer, difficulties would develop. And so it hopes the German armies will be able to turn against the English after a swift termination of the Russian campaign. It did not attach any critical importance to the American war effort" (15).

In 1943, after the German defeats, Antonescu's government began to look for contacts with the western allies in the capitals of the neutral countries. Then it also accepted the contacts initiated by the Soviet diplomats and conducted secret negotiations concerning the conditions for getting out of the war.

After he found in 1943 that it was impossible to bring about the solution he would have liked, namely a separate peace between Germany and the western allies in order to continue the anti-Soviet war, Ion Antonescu declared himself ready to leave the war along with Germany if Anglo-American troops were to reach Romania. Of course the English and Americans did not send troops into Romania. At his meeting with Hitler on 5 August 1944, as indicated by critical analysis of the reports on the conversations, Antonescu assured the Fuehrer of his loyalty and the decison to continue the war on Germany's side.

The RCP appealed to the entire people and all parties, groups and public figures to form the Anti-Hitlerite Patriotic Front and pointed out the necessity of liquidating Antonescu's government as a first step toward Romania's liberation from the domination of Hitlerite Germany and its departure from the war against the United Nations. But to leave no possibility untried, however remote, of undermining the Hitlerite domination and in view of the urgings of the historic parties to try to "turn" Antonescu against Germany, as well as information about the allies' contacts with Romanian negotiators, the Communist Party, as indicated by some documents, would have welcomed any favorable reply of Antonescu's government to the armistice proposals of the Soviet Union, England and the United States. Even after the start of the Soviet offensive on the Iasi-Chisinau front on 20 August 1944, when the vital national interests more than ever required Romania's immediate departure from the Hitlerite war, Ion Antonescu, as critical analysis of the documents shows, though inclined to resume the diplomatic contacts with the allies, took his former stand of continuing the anti-Soviet war until the impossible arrival of the Anglo-American troops in Romania and the illusory acquisition of "freedom of action" from Hitler.

Examination of the various aspects of the political regime in Romania in the period from January 1941 to 23 August 1944 leads to the conclusion that Antonescu's dictatorship combined essential traits in common with those of the fascist regimes in Germany and Italy, which traits originated in the nature and social function of fascism, but it had traits of its own that did not diminish its fascist character but distinguished it from the dictatorships of Hitler and Mussolini. The differences originated in Romania's particular conditions. Antonescu's regime, as a totalitarian form of the bourgeois state, was affected by its establishment as a result of the external pressures and intervention of Germany on behalf of the narrow pro-Hitlerite circles. Marshal Ion Antonescu did not use a party of his own as an instrument of political power, but mainly the military organization directly under him. This feature characteristic of Romania in 1941-1944, combined with some general "traditional" traits of fascism, justifies the evaluation of Antonescu's regime as a particular variant of fascism, namely as a military-fascist dictatorship.

FOOTNOTES

1. Cf. Helga Grebing, "Aktuelle Theorien ueber Faschismus und Konservatismus. Eine Kritik," Stuttgart, 1974, pp 13-14.

2. Gh. Barbul, "Memorial Antonescu. Le troisieme homme de l'Axe," Paris, pp 74-75.

3. Bucharest State Archives, USA Microfilm Reserve, Reel 58 T 77-882, Frame 5630375.

4. L. Patrascanu, "Basic Problems of Romania," Bucharest 1944, 2d Edition, p 211.

5. "Trial of the Great National Betrayal. Shorthand Record of the Discussions at the People's Tribunal Concerning Antonescu's Government," Bucharest 1946, pp 35, 301-302.

6. Archive of the Institute of Historical and Social-Political Studies, Telegram No 1,147 of the German minister in Bucharest.

7. Archive of the RCP Central Committee, Reserve 103, File 8,200, Sheet 5.

8. "I documenti diplomatici italiani," Series IX, Vol V, pp 517-518, 532.

9. Archive of the Institute of Historical and Social-Political Studies, Telegram No 1,147 of the German minister in Bucharest.

10. Archive of the Institute of Historical and Social-Political Studies, Reserve 10, File 9. Telegram of 4 Sep 1940 of the German minister in Bucharest.

11. A. Hillgruber, "Hitler, Koenig Carol und Marschall Antonescu," Wiesbaden 1954, p 177.

12. "Pages from the Military History of the Romanian People," Studies, Vol 5-6. Coordinator Ilie Ceausescu, Bucharest 1979, pp 240-241.

13. A. Hillgruber, "Staatsmaenner und Diplomaten bei Hitler," Frankfurt an Main 1970, pp 59-60.

14. A. Hillgruber, "Hitler, Koenig Carol und Marschall Antonescu," p 177.

15. A. Hillgruber, "Staatsmaenner und Diplomaten bei Hitler," p 49.

5186
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CONSTITUTIONAL SPECIALIST DISCUSSES AUTONOMOUS PROVINCES

Belgrade OPSTINA in Serbo-Croatian Nos 10-11, Oct-Nov 81 pp 11-16

[Article* by Dr Jovan Djordjevic, member of the academy: "Autonomous Provinces and Their Place and Function in the Republic and in the Federation"]

[Text] I

1. The word "autonomy" comes from the ancient Greek term "autonoma," which means "in a position to enact one's own laws." "Autonomy" has subsequently had the same meaning as self-government and in philosophy has expressed the essence of freedom.

In geographically and ethnically complex communities, autonomy signifies the status of an independent group or organization which is not a state, nor is it a federal unit or self-governed communal entity. In that context autonomy is something less and more restricted than a federal unit, but broader and more essential in its powers and status than local self-government. It is then usually equated with the region and the political forms of regionalism.

2. In contemporary history and practice concerning the status of autonomy there are two conventional systems. The first is the hierarchical system in which the republic or state has a central position and ultimately has a check on all autonomy, even proclaimed political autonomy, and administers it, especially with respect to the basic economic, political, external and security interests and affairs.

The autonomous oblast and to some extent the autonomous republic in the USSR system of government, as well as provincial autonomy in PRC and in Italy offer a model of that kind of autonomy. In this case autonomy is a subordinate subsystem within the framework of the state's economic, political and legal system. Yugoslavia recognized a similar form of autonomy up until the 1963 Constitution and the 1971 Amendments, which means up to the present constitution or, more precisely, the constitutional system adopted in 1974.

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* Authorized version of a speech delivered at a professional conference of the Political Science Association of SR [Socialist Republic] Serbia.

3. The other type of autonomy is an externalized autonomy in which the autonomous unit has an autonomous status within the framework of the unified system of the state. It is the state which determines and restricts the competencies of this autonomy, handles certain economic, political and cultural affairs for it, and ultimately protects its existence and status. This type of autonomy has existed in history, especially in the history of northern Europe as well as on other continents, especially in Southeast Asia and China. Even today it persists in Sweden, and to some extent in China as well.

4. Present-day autonomy in Yugoslavia is an internal, but at the same time total autonomy.

It is realized under the specific conditions of a complex and federal community in which self-management is mixed with nationalism and statehood, and that over the whole range of the political, that is, federal, structure. One effect of this has been that this internal autonomy, in its constitutional status and certain objective needs and tendencies, has been expressed less as an organic and well-adjusted autonomy, and more as an externalized and autonomistic autonomy.

Given those conditions, and especially under the influence of the ever greater equality of the nationalities and ethnic minorities and that of the federal model in Yugoslavia and in Serbia, a form of autonomy which approaches federalism has established itself and gained strength since the beginning of the seventies. This was expressed in the formula that was adopted to the effect that the autonomous provinces are an element of federalism. In the context of political theory this corresponds to the objective, and indeed the constitutional situation, especially if we understand that federalism pertains to all forms of unification and autonomy, and not merely to the federal state and governmental unions (federation and confederation).

But from the rational and logical, the functional and the constitutional viewpoints, illogicalities arise when a relationship or a structure is defined with differing terms or with terms that have differing theoretical and logical meaning. This can be allowed when certain terms have an historical and symbolic origin, as is the case with Switzerland, where this typical federation is called a confederation, which formerly was its name. This kind of dualism--as critical thought demonstrates, and history confirms--is not only contradictory, but in practical application it results in dysfunctionality.

The same occurs when a form of asymmetrical federalism is established in the structure of a common state. This is a federalism favoring only one partner and depriving the other of autonomy. The former is favored not only in that it enjoys broad autonomy, but because it is included in the makeup and decisionmaking of the other partner, which for various historical, political and even symbolic reasons is regarded as a joint entity. In that way the partner which in our terminology is referred to by the erroneous and truly horrible expression "Serbia proper" is deprived not only of its identity, but also of its right to equality.

Asymmetrical federalism or alleged federalism is condemned in the theory of federalism because it breaks down not only the logic of federalism, which is a

symmetrical logic, but also the equality of the participants, which is the moral and political foundation of any true and democratic federalism. History shows that asymmetrical federalism quickly turns into hegemony of one participant or into separatism of the other. Which is why asymmetrical federalism has been abandoned in every rational construction of federalism, and this was done with one of the recent examples in the political system of Czechoslovakia, in the period following World War II, before that country's present constitution was adopted.

The contradictory and irrational nature of asymmetrical federalism in Yugoslavia, from 1971 up to the well-known events in Kosovo, was held under the influence of various overt and covert tendencies. Among those tendencies, which were and have remained an operative factor, one must distinguish, aside from the Constitution of SR Serbia and its implementation or nonimplementation, both the SFRY Constitution and also the political and mental climate which fragmented the ethnic structure of the country and contributed to the permanent inclusion of autonomy in the orbit of federalism since 1971. Thus the communal federalism with an ethnic basis that came about in the socialist revolution and in the period of its postwar implementation, was transformed into a nationalistic federalism based on the autonomous province. The more that kind of federalism was manifested, the greater the contradictions and dysfunctionalities that cropped up in the structure and functioning both of the political system and also of sociopolitical life of SR Serbia and within it.

II

1. Differentiation in thought and in social practice presupposes and creates two possibilities: unification, consensus and community, on the one hand, and isolation, the cult of the individual, and indeed even separatism and autarky on the other.

In the context of these contradictions and possible conflicts among the tendencies which differentiation gives rise to and to some extent makes possible, autonomy has two basic historic goals. The first corresponds to the general aspiration and need of social, and especially of national and ethnic-cultural groups, for self-expression and establishment of their political and cultural identity. Autonomy is thereby set in opposition to the inherited or upcoming centralism, to possible assimilation of some by others, or to inequality in institutions and in the population at large.

The other basic goal is manifested in the need and desire for differences to be unified and thereby overcome within the framework of unity and of a democratic complex of the whole.

These objective and rational goals may be one of the bases for understanding and clarifying the way these goals have been set in opposition to one another and the conflicts that have been arising on this basis. This also applies both to clarifying and understanding the goals which have a bearing on establishment of autonomies in Yugoslavia and also to clarification of the conflicts concerning them and the room that is open for emerging from them and for overcoming those conflicts.

2. Autonomies came about in Yugoslavia as the result of its socialist and democratic transformation, which cannot be unless the identity of social and ethnic groups is recognized or without sociopolitical independence, and also as the result of the need for new historical syntheses in overcoming the old social and political forms. Appealing to the history, biological origin and early date of settlement of an area is not only unhistorical and unscholarly, it even prevents the true states of affairs from being discovered and prevents ways out of them from being sought and attained.

An inability to establish those truths and ways of seeking and finding them transforms general and common problems, and accordingly also crises, which are always specific, into local problems and localism. From this follows the well-known truth that the establishment and purport of autonomies in Yugoslavia are neither local problems, nor are they related exclusively to the provinces, but are related also to Serbia as a whole. This also applies to establishing the foundation for resolving them when there are conflicts with the whole, that is, with the existence and future of the community. But also when directions are sought not only to clarify and reveal them, but also to overcome them.

These are joint problems both of the autonomies and also of Serbia, and indeed of Yugoslavia as a whole. They are inseparable from the conflicts, states and crises in those overall communities. Accordingly, the question of "community consensus," which is rightly emphasized today, but not sufficiently defined and oriented, must take as its point of departure a common idea and recognition of community in production, of difficulties and crises, in the search for ways out--without individual accusations and a turning of the back on reality and on general or community or joint responsibility.

3. The second direction in clarifying states of affairs and thereby conflicts, as well as ways of emerging from them, necessitates an examination of the circumstances which have supported and facilitated the emergence and effect of centripetal rather than centrifugal forces and those [circumstances] which have been depriving socialism of its inherent need and ability to develop unity and the whole and to promote centripetal forces and tendencies toward integration throughout the whole of society and in the behavior of the autonomies particularly. These include the expansion and strengthening of the state vis-a-vis self-management. The proclaimed self-managing and democratic political system in Yugoslavia and in the autonomy has been taking on ever higher forms and elements of the traditional national state. As everywhere, even in its micro form the national state has engendered nationalism, exclusiveness, regionalism, ideology instead of creative thought, and consumer attitudes and sets of mind by contrast with creative work and productivity in production.

The renewal and maintenance of such states cannot contribute to emergence from such states in the province, nor, for the same reason, to overcoming the aggravated and conflict situations that exist today in one of the provinces, which cannot be equated with the identity and aspirations of the other province.

4. The national state sponsors and supports both a national and a quasi-national economy. Given the conditions of economic, political and cultural underdevelopment, the national economy usually remains passive and consumption-oriented. It directs its energies and orientation toward an attitude of

exigency, and that concretely, toward an attitude of claims on the state. Claims predominantly of an economic nature. Statism is constantly engendered out of those demands.

Those demands disorient the internal creative forces and potential of the province, and in the republic they accentuate statism and a statist national economy. All of this gives rise in both regions to constant demands upon the other, a strengthening of statism, of contributions and of taxes.

In that context the more advanced partner of this national and undemocratic relationship drops to the level of understanding and effort of the one which is less developed and incapacitates his policymaking, not only in the economic sphere, so that it cannot plan, cannot create, cannot alter and cannot foresee.

5. An exclusive and quasi-national economy, in the context of a strengthened nationalism and statism, cannot furnish the forces to resolve contradictions in a community, and that means in the autonomous provinces and in the relationship to the republic and of all of them together toward the Federation, and of the latter toward them as a whole. Autarky, nationalism and statism engender and develop the emergence of bureaucracy, apathy of the masses and a weakening of the authority of both the government and also of self-management. This becomes all the more dangerous insofar as it contributes to a weakening of the creative interest of self-management, of democratic processes and of the strength of commitment of the working class, allied with the peasantry and other active groups, in Yugoslavia as a whole.

Only self-managing democracy, in itself and for itself free of ethnic and cultural stress, a vigorous, cooperative and responsible socialist social community at all levels of life and decisionmaking, is the way and the means of resolving conflicts between the integrational and disintegrational processes everywhere in the world and under socialism. There are no "saviors" who are located outside or in the mechanism of government, however formally strong it may be. The force which builds the model of a society and can free it of its weaknesses does not lie in a strong state nor in a national state economy. Appeals to such "saviors" are only evidence that certain groups, which make such appeals and seek roles as leaders for themselves, are unable to see that salvation lies in exposing states of affairs and finding ways and methods of overcoming them in the interest of the working class and progress.

Only that interest is capable of imparting strength and enthusiasm to the criticism of the status quo and to ideas and directions which make it possible to find the right way out.

All else in this domain only weakens militance and vigor, thoughtfulness and political acuity in debating and resolving crises, inequality and difficulties in political and cultural relations among the sociopolitical communities in present-day Yugoslavia.

The reverse direction on the same line can only revive statism, bureaucracy, negativism and passivity in the political system and in the consciousness and behavior of the leading political forces of Yugoslavia and its individual

citizens themselves. We cannot be otherwise and better unless we are able to examine and acknowledge who we are and where we are, where we are going and where we can get, rather than constantly colliding with one another and wandering.

III

1. This presupposes not only that our debates be frank and sincere and not only that our dialogues and exchanges of opinions be constructive. There are no constructive dialogues and no search for the way out in the field which is now of particular interest to us unless the true state of affairs is ascertained in Kosovo and in the relationship between the autonomy, the republic and the Federation as a whole. The true state of affairs is not ascertained solely on the basis of the constitution, and still less are the constitution and its application the only true road toward a way out of the present contradictions and difficulties in those states of affairs and relations. Still less does this lie in mere verbalism, accusations and self-accusation.

Dialogues and a new style of speech, of thought, of politics and of activity are needed to evaluate all these matters.

There is no new style unless we are aware of what we are saying, of what we are speaking about, why we are speaking, what orientation we are adopting, and with whom we are speaking.

2. Our political life is burdened down with verbalism, and that means not only with empty words, but even, as Marx put it, with dead ideas. This is the purport of a verbalism which burdens not only our dialogues, but also our search for the truth. Speech is the first and basic form of communication and method of distinguishing the truth from untruth, stupidity from intelligence, camouflaged ignorance from true knowledge. A thought is dead when it is schematic and dogmatic and serves the interests of everyday policy and when it is uncritical. A policy is dead when it is unable to foresee, to establish truth and responsibility toward itself and toward others. Activities do not initiate anything but support inertia when they are not inspired, unified, moral and responsible.

3. It is only with changes of this kind that we can have fruitful dialogues. In science and in politics, in public life and in private life we must nurture this new style of speech and behavior. There is none of all that unless science constantly produces new ideas, and unless policy frees itself of bureaucratic overlays, personalization of power and specious omniscience.

At historic moments when we confront profound crises and accumulated difficulties and contradictions, a change is needed in the ethics of society and man. The elements of that activist [illegible]ctive ethics must be based on the principle that battles are not lost [illegible]y are begun, and that the truth is not dangerous and unpleasant even when [illegible]njures individual interests and inclinations.

4. In all of this scientific thought must not only be truthful, but also concrete. It is only under those conditions that it is scientific, and a scientific debate on such complicated political and national complexes as present-day autonomies, the autonomous provinces in Yugoslavia in particular, necessitates such thought.

Scientific method necessitates that at the same time we overcome what is referred to as destructive or descriptive theory. When concrete and analytic thought is applied without critical analysis, there is no investigation of reality nor any way of revealing all the complicated relations within it, and thereby no way of achieving an objective and acceptable truth or understanding among men.

7045
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WESTERN COMMENT ON SERBIAN LC CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 30 Dec 81 p 6

[Article by Viktor Meier: "Voivodina's Successes -- Meeting of the Serbian Central Committee"]

[Text] Vienna 29 December -- In a 3-day meeting carried by radio and television and attracting great public attention, the Communist Central Committee of Yugoslavia's constituent Republic of Serbia discussed problems concerning the federalist constitutional system. The focus was on the relationship between the Republic of Serbia and the two autonomous regions -- Kosovo and Voivodina -- situated within its territory. Observers in Belgrade meanwhile feel that most of the speakers at the meeting were looking beyond the boundaries of their republic and generally taking aim at a regionalization of Yugoslavia that is allegedly too far-reaching. Many an observer thinks the strong republican centralism in Serbia that was expressed at the meeting might stir concern in other republics as well and intensify autonomist tendencies in these areas.

Nearly all of Serbia's well-known politicians -- Federal Parliament Chairman Dragoslav Markovic; Ivan Stambolic, head of the Serbian government; Presidium member Minic and Serbian party chief Vlaskalic -- propounded the thesis that autonomous regions could never enjoy the same rights as republics. Vlaskalic brought out this point in his keynote address. According to Markovic, the Yugoslav constitution defines autonomous regions simply as "political self-management units," while republics have the additional character of states. The regions are therefore supposed to fit themselves into the structures of the Republic of Serbia on the state as well as the party level. The attempts by Serbian politicians to put the regions back under their wings had begun following last spring's disturbances in Kosovo. Politicians from the regions, especially from Kosovo, had said earlier that their autonomous territories were, like the republics, also "constitutive factors" in present-day Yugoslavia and that they had autonomous rights, even outside the republican constitution.

Kosovo's demoralized politicians remained in the background at the Serbian Central Committee meeting; the debate consequently revolved all the more around the Voivodina region, which includes the territory north of the Danube [River] extending as far as the Hungarian border. The region has about 2 million inhabitants; nearly 450,000 of them are Hungarians. The majority are Serbs, who also wield the political power. It is thus a matter of a dispute between two Serbian groups. There is

an economic and historic explanation for the sense of independence felt by the Serbs in Voivodina: Until 1918 the area belonged to Austria-Hungary; it was better developed than the old kingdom of Serbia; it has a better infrastructure; and today, with its agricultural abundance, its petroleum and its industry, it ranks beside Slovenia as Yugoslavia's second relatively prosperous region. It pursues its own policies particularly in agriculture: large-scale field crop production while maintaining formal private ownership. Voivodina is obviously reluctant when it comes to sharing its economic successes with the rest of Serbia. Together with Croatia, the region recently demanded that the petroleum produced in its territory be carried on the books as a foreign exchange account and that it be subtracted from the foreign exchange quota which the republics and regions have to provide for Yugoslavia's total oil imports.

Voivodina's politicians and authorities reacted flexibly to the Serbian republican centralist attacks and firmly on the basic issues. According to the region's spokesmen, led by party chief Krunic, Voivodina definitely believes in the principle of "a community of interests" with the Republic of Serbia and is demonstrating this in practical ways; it has also approved the Serbian joint economic plan. However, it wishes to realize this community of interests not so much within the framework of government institutions as in practical economic activity and links between businesses. Other spokesmen from Voivodina were even more blunt, saying that the regions came into being not merely through the stroke of an administrative pen and that it was simply out of the question for them to be reduced now to mere "cultural autonomy."

Government chief Stambolic noted that some Serbian politicians were seeking to justify their republican centralism with the opinion that the events in Kosovo had managed to assume such proportions only because the secretary of that region had long been rejecting the republic's "offer" of militia reinforcements. This Kosovo secretary recently had to give up his official functions. Observers in Belgrade are under the impression that in Kosovo the republican centralism emanating from Belgrade is largely responsible for creating a mood of distrust of the Albanian nationality. This policy continues to meet with stiff and not ineffective resistance. Speakers also pointed out repeatedly that it has so far not been possible to pass the new Serbian law on universal public defense because of "obstruction" from the regions. It had been proposed not least of all because there had been serious weaknesses in the public defense system in Kosovo. The Serbian leaders pointed out at the Central Committee meeting that as early as 1977 they had brought up for discussion the problems of relations between the republic and autonomous regions and had wanted to solve them in a manner to their liking. It appears that this issue, like many other problems, had been shelved by Tito at that time.

7452
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BELGRADE WEEKLY DETAILS INCIDENTS IN KOSOVO PROVINCE

Affronts, Dormitory Inequities, Arson

Belgrade ILUSTROVANA POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian No 1202, 17 Nov 81 pp 22-23

[Article by Bogosav Marjanovic: "The Unseen Are Not Idle"]

[Text] Nothing, as they say, can surprise us except, as has just happened, the first snow. It was in that storm that we set out for Kosovo and barely made it. The planes are not flying, since the Pristina Airport is snowed under, and the roads are slippery. Things in Kosovo are once again less than perfect. That recent whistle from residents of the university dormitory in Pristina, and not just that, has caused the anguish of many in Kosovo and outside it.

In answering a question from a Zagreb TV reporter "Is there shooting in Kosovo?" Memet Malici, provincial secretary for internal affairs, recently answered with a smile on his face before millions of viewers:

"There is shooting, but at weddings!"

The answer was accurate. The rumors which the enemy is constantly circulating to the effect that the woods in Kosovo are full of guerrillas and that they are waging guerrilla warfare are indeed rumors. But it is true that certain things have been happening in Kosovo recently which, it seems to us, do not instill hope for the normalization of human relations and relations among the nationalities. People are withdrawing into themselves, into their own homes. There is, it is said, much talk, but little done to overcome the situation. The politicians are constantly reiterating in meetings that the "political-security situation in Kosovo is good, but that the enemy is still active." We have already become inured to those words, we were told by Kosovites....

Recently a traditional soccer game was played at the stadium in Pristina between the all-star teams of Kosovo and Montenegro. The atmosphere during the game was one of wholesome athletic rivalry and rooting, but afterwards little groups of fans returning from the stadium shouted: "Republic--Prekaz." At first people said: "Oh, they are abusing the name of the soccer player Prekazi to pass off a hostile slogan." Participants in this unwholesome incident merely laughed at those words. Why? That became known only after the commotion was over and when the "fans" themselves began to brag at having outwitted the "authorities."

Actually they were not shouting the name of the well-known soccer player, but that of the village Prekaz, which is where the well-known misfortune occurred last spring to those brave and honorable young policemen who belong to the special detachment of the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs, which the entire press wrote about at length and on which the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs issued a communique.

University Students Who Are Suitable and "Suitable"

Classes began on schedule at Pristina University, on 1 October. Many students, those who had obtained a "visa" from their opstinas and local communities, settled into the dormitories which for their comfort (especially in the new 1,000-bed dormitory) might be the envy of the best American colleges. And the subsidized dining hall in the city, the one where the counterrevolution began with the spilling of soup, has also been expanded and refurbished, and it can be ranked among the best city restaurants. Room and board in the student dormitory costs a total of 1,150 dinars a month. A trifle. That is why many people were amazed that the student dormitories with a capacity of 4,000 were not full. Can it be that in Kosovo there are not that many "morally and politically suitable students" who deserve to live in a dormitory? It seems that the declaration that this was a condition for acceptance in the dormitory was only a slogan. According to what Redzep Gasi, chairman of the action conference of the League of Communists at Pristina University, said at last week's meeting of the conference, "a very small number of members of the League of Communists" have been accepted in the student dormitories.

There is no reason, then, to be amazed at what has been happening in those dormitories and in the schools of Pristina University. Professor Hajredin Hodza complained to Lazar Mojsov, when the latter was recently visiting Kosovo and Pristina University:

"All of us here, both teachers and students, see hostile slogans spring up before our eyes, from one end of a wall to the other, in letters 2 meters high!"

Slogans are still being written daily on the walls of the university's schools and dormitories. The painters have their hands full painting them over. So do the people in the Student Center. No sooner do they accept students who have brought certificates concerning their moral and political fitness from their opstinas than they must expel from the dormitories those who were previously accepted with such certificates, since they have been caught writing slogans. Thus they are registering one group, while they are expelling another. They are not getting anywhere. They have been altogether unable to fill the dormitories, but many honorable students, Albanian, Serbs, and Montenegrins, have been left at the mercy of the gouging and chicanery of landlords, since they cannot obtain passes to the dormitory because of "unsuitability" or "nationality quotas."

Who Is That Whistling There

An honorable Montenegrin girl with pretty eyes who is in her second year of law school and who spends her free time as a cleaning woman in an establishment in Pristina in order to earn enough to live on, says:

"I pay 2,500 dinars for my tiny little room. Many of my fellow students do the same, but about 1,000 beds are left empty in the dormitories. And those who have settled in there 'out of turn' are now whistling without a care in the world. Have they no shame, if before no one else, at least before their fellows who are wandering about the city and who are being gouged by landlords?"

And indeed all honorable people in Kosovo speak with abhorrence about this recent whistling, shouting and noise from the residents of the dormitories. They ask themselves: "Who is that who is now whistling there again, at whom and why?"

They have been whistling at the soldiers and policemen, and this whistling has not been so brief and innocent as has been officially stated. A convoy of buses filled with Kosovo reservists was passing in front of the dormitories on its way back from the usual daily drills. Perhaps the fathers, brothers and relatives of those young men and women who were in the dormitory. So that the buses would move more quickly and easily, a police car went in front and cleared the way for them. When the convoy passed the Student Center, all of a sudden the residents of nearby dormitories gathered at the windows and on the balconies and began to whistle in unison, to shout and to beat rhythmically on the windows with their hands or one thing and another.

An eyewitness of the event who lives in the neighborhood (his name is known to the editors, but he has asked us not to publish it), a person who can be believed unreservedly, says:

"There were," he says, "more than 500 of them. All the windows and balconies were simply bristling with young men and women. They whistled and pounded and made a racket for almost half an hour. It is true that I did not hear a single hostile slogan."

Again They Are Using Children

A meeting of the action conference of the League of Communists of Kosovo University in Pristina was held last week to debate the security and political situation at the university. Newsmen, Pristina correspondents of newspapers, radio, television and TANJUG were not invited at all. Only editorial offices in Pristina were informed. Presumably they wanted to keep everything in the family. It is said that even that--the official announcement that students had whistled "several minutes" would not have been issued if EKSPRES POLITIKA, whose correspondent was an eyewitness of this unpleasant event, had not been the first to inform the public.

According to the story of the Pristina newspaper JEDINSTVO, Redzep Gasi, who is the chairman of the action committee of the League of Communists at the university in Pristina, has now said, certain of his statements before the academic year began not withstanding:

"The political situation at the university in Pristina is still burdened with difficulties, and this necessitates intensified activity by all of us to stabilize the situation, especially since recently the enemy has made itself felt by

writing slogans and committing provocations in the Student Center and in higher educational institutions...."

Gasi as a matter of fact admitted that vigilance has become slack at the university and, what is worst, the differentiation among students and even more among faculty members has by no means been completed.

It is not just university students that the enemy is egging on to commit real misdeeds. It is doing this with children as well. The walls and benches of many elementary schools in the city are scribbled over with hostile slogans. Children come home with the slogans "Kosovo a Republic" scribbled on their palms. Parents come to the schools, complain, weep, ask who it is who is playing around with their children in such a flagrant and uncivilized manner. But often they do not get a real answer.

The district public prosecutor in Prizren, Jakup Gurmani, admittedly in a conversation off the record, told us an almost incredible tale about "children's pranks." In the space of just a few days they burned down the Center for Deaf-Mute Children in Prizren and the new department store in the center of the city.

Unseen Arsonists

"In the case of the department store, the investigation is still under way, and we are looking for the causes," Gurmani said. "It is interesting that the watchman whose job it was to keep an eye out did not notice anything, nor did he smell smoke until the fire had gotten a good start on the building."

In the case of the center for deaf-mutes, prosecutor Gurmani has an unofficial explanation which admittedly sounds to us like a bedtime story. He says that a few young boys used a fork to pick the lock of the center and get inside. One o. these mischievous boys was wearing a very dirty shirt. Inside he saw many clean shirts hanging to dry. He took one and put it on. He set fire to his own and left it. And that is how the entire building caught fire.

Two nights after the burning of the department store, which supposedly was locked and had no one inside, a policeman walking the main street of Prizren at midnight was astounded to see the door standing wide open to the large furniture showroom of the commercial enterprise Lirija. He thought there were thieves inside, and he made a thorough cautious inspection. But everything was in its place. When people went off and woke up the manager, he said quite calmly and without any excitement:

"I forgot to close the door."

It really has an eerie effect, the charred concrete skeleton of the modern department store. Until yesterday it was the pride of people in Prizren, since it fitted in exceptionally well with the old architecture of the famous Prizren fountain.

The people of Prizren, who are always cheerful and talkative, have been depressed and concerned because of all the unpleasant events taking place in Kosovo

and in their city. This city, a museum in itself, was well known for its concord even in the most difficult days of the war.

"We all lived like brothers. The enemy struck us a blow, but we also got him. We have shared our last bite with our neighbors. Now my neighbor even complains about my hens," says an old lady in Prizren.

An important ceremony was announced for last Tuesday in the Pec Patriarchate. On that day Patriarch German dedicated the abbey of the patriarchate, which went under construction in 1979, before the old one was set fire to. The enemy spread the story that this would not be an ordinary religious occasion, but a demonstration of Great Serb nationalism. Nothing of the kind. It was truly a modest and dignified assembly of religious people who had gathered to dedicate according to religious customs the new abbey where the nuns would live.

This ceremony was also attended by Golub Gojkovic, chairman of the Kosovo Commission for Religious Affairs, Rusten Bejtula, member of the Executive Council of SAP [Socialist Autonomous Province] Kosovo, and Rade Zvicer, president of Pec Opstina.

Comrade Dzavid Nimani recently delivered a speech in the Metalik enterprise in Djakovica, his first since resigning his post as chairman of the Presidency of SAP Kosovo, in which he made a very fierce attack on the rapid spread of irredentism and Great Albanian nationalism in Kosovo. This speech was published in the press. With all their troubles, people in Kosovo had a bit of a laugh when they read it:

"Dzavid has arrived in Kosovo a bit late. His speech was at least one decade too late."

Unresolved Altercation, Professors' Fisticuffs

Belgrade ILUSTROVANA POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian No 1203, 24 Nov 81 pp 20-21

[Article by Bogosav Marjanovic: "Draginja Is Not Retreating Even Now"]

[Text] At a recent expanded meeting of the Urosevac Opstina LC [League of Communists] Committee which was debating the exodus of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo, Staja Zdravkovic, president of the Urosevac Opstina Assembly, angry because the analysis of this very sensitive phenomenon in Kosovo was vague and did not cite examples of pressure on Serbs and Montenegrins to move out and lacked a political assessment of the entire case, stood up and said:

"No mention is made in this analysis of the case of Fahredin Gunga, former director of TV Pristina, which at one time aroused the public of our opstina, was not talked about for a long time, and even now is not talked about. In the presence of a delegation from the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, whose host he was in a hotel on Brezovica, Gunga slapped Draginja Arsic, a woman from that area who fought in the Partizans in 1941, without provocation and said to her: 'You will all move away from here....'"

President Staja Zdravkovic also cited other examples, but we set off on the trail of the case of Comrade Arsic.

It Was a Sunny Day

Draginja Arsic was the first woman in Kosovo to take up a gun in 1941 and she remained among the Kosovo Partizans throughout the war. Her father, mother, sister and four other members of her family died in the National Liberation Struggle. At the end of the war she was a captain, had been wounded several times, her health was broken, she carried the 1941 Commemorative Emblem with nine wartime decorations, including the Order for Valor. Subsequently she was decorated for her sociopolitical work with the Order of Brotherhood and Unity First Class and the Order of the Republic with silver garland. She has been secretary of the Strpac Opstina Committee of the CPY [Communist Party of Yugoslavia], a member of the Urosevac District CPY Committee, a member of the Kosovo Provincial Committee of the Federation of Veterans, a delegate to the Assembly of SAP Kosovo, and a member of the Federal Board of the Federation of Associations of Yugoslav Veterans.

Because of the further deterioration of her health, she retired early. From time to time she would come from Pristina, where she lives with her family, to Brezovica, where she has a vacation cottage. Unfortunately, she came on 16 June 1979, when a delegation of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania had also come there, hosted by Fahredin Gunga, the well-known Kosovo poet and director of TV Pristina.

Draginja Arsic speaks reluctantly about this unpleasant event. "What is there for me to tell you?" she said with embarrassment. "Why should you write about that?... The comrades know about it, and no one has undertaken anything up to this point. At least if someone had called me in to talk with me, to console me at least. Now it is no longer of any importance to me. But at the time when it happened to me, I filed charges with the police in Strpac, I wrote to the Provincial Committee of the League of Communists of Kosovo, to the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia and to the Central Committee of the LCY. I learned that 1.5 years ago some kind of commission was established in Pristina to study this case. What they did I don't know. They did not summon me, nor did anyone inform me about the outcome...."

Draginja Arsic recalled this event with a heavy heart:

"That day has been well preserved in my memory. It was sunny, but it has remained in my memory as the blackest of days. The 16th of June 1979.... I stopped by the Breza Hotel in Brezovica. At the desk I came upon an unpleasant scene. Some man was shouting at Voja the doorman. 'I am the director of TV Pristina.... I will move everyone out of Brezovica.... You will all disappear from here.... Why did the hotel director not line up all the personnel in front of the entrance to greet the delegation from Albania, as would be proper?'"

Draginja Arsic caught her breath for a moment, and then resumed:

"At first I really did not believe that this was the director of such a prestigious institution. I was not acquainted with him. I thought that he was some drunk. The doorman Voja was struck dumb as a stone, and then, probably to put an end to this painful situation, he addressed me: 'Auntie Draginja, what can I do for you?' At that moment Fahredin Gunga turned and slapped me. I naturally stepped back, but he continued and began to hit me with his hands, to curse me, ordering me to throw down the manicure kit I had been using at the time. When he struck me again with his hand in the chest, I pushed him away. Only then did he cease, but he continued to shout that they would move all of us out of here. This was a horrible humiliation for me, since all of this took place before the eyes of the members of the Albanian delegation, who were looking on with enjoyment from the dining room. Nevertheless, some people came up and took Gunga off to the dining room. That did not bring him to his senses. He came out again and stood behind my back with his hackles raised. He took me by my right arm and began to pull me outside, cursing and shouting: 'Let's fight it out!'

"I told him: 'Come to your senses, man, tell me first what we are to fight about, and then perhaps we will fight!' But he just pulled me so hard he scraped the skin on my arm. At that point a bus driver Bogi Cvetkovic and my brother-in-law Djura, manager of the hotel, came running up. They tore me away from him. They were outraged and wanted to settle accounts with him, but I did not allow it. I was thinking of our country's reputation, of the shame of its happening in front of a foreign delegation...."

Draginja Arsic finished her sad tale with a deep sigh:

"The whole event shook me greatly. And indeed all honest inhabitants of this region, both Serbs and Albanians. Nothing like it happened to me even during the war. When I calmed down and thought everything over a little better, I saw that this act on the part of Fahredin Gunga was neither accidental nor harmless. This was in fact confirmed by the unpleasant events which took place this year in Kosovo....

"As far as I know," Draginja Arsic continued, "no one has touched even a hair on Fahredin Gunga's head because of this. Last year he was even decorated, though I am not aware of exactly what decoration.... To be sure, after the counterrevolution in Kosovo, he moved from the post of director of TV Pristina to that of the director of the provincial bureau for publication of textbooks. What kind of sense that makes is clear enough," the subject of our interview concluded.

It is true that if this tale that is sad but true had been mentioned in the Urosevac analysis of the causes of the exodus of non-Albanians from Kosovo, everything would have been much clearer, especially with respect to altogether ordinary people. After all, what kind of justice could they expect when this kind of conspiracy of silence has prevailed concerning such a prestigious and meritorious individual as Draginja Arsic. Only hardened fighters like herself could take that without retreating. Many others did not....

Including the Bijelic family from Pristina.

The Bijelic family is preparing to leave Kosovo.

"We can no longer live here," Nikola Bijelic says. "My daughter, who is a physician, recently moved away to Sokobanja. She could no longer stand the mistreatment at work. She had complained, but no one had helped her.... Now, it turns out that my son Slobodan, a professor at the School of Technology in Pristina, is also leaving. We and our children will go, too."

A Stone in the Display Case

This is not the first time the Bijelic's, as they told us with bitterness, have left their home. In 1942 the Ballists drove them away from their farm in the village Vojinovac near Stimlje, where their ancestors had come in 1938 [sic] from Bihac in Bosnia. During that flight they were taken in by peasants in Knic, near Kragujevac. The father of the family, Nikola Bijelic, went off to join the Partizans. He was a lieutenant and company commander in the 6th Proletarian East Bosnian Brigade. After the Liberation, he held various posts in Kosovo: secretary of the local committee in Lipljan, director of the plywood factory, director of the magnesite mine, and adviser in the Executive Council of SAP Kosovo.

His wife Danica, who sobbed constantly as we talked, also comes from a prestigious and patriotic family, the Trkulja's from the village Staro Gradsko in Kosovo. During their war leaders of the uprising had a refuge in their house, among them the national hero Emin Duraku.

The sizable number of their decorations are kept in a glass case in the living room reserved for guests, but there is also a stone. With it the demonstrators broke the arm of their son Slobodan on 2 April of this year. When he saw his students, led by troublemakers, heading for the town, he ran out into the courtyard and began to advise them to return to the dormitory. They pelted him with rocks, and he was lucky to suffer no more than a broken arm.... When he extricated himself, he did not dare to go for treatment to the Pristina Hospital, but he went for help in Nis....

After the disturbances quieted down, in May, some boys attacked them and their grandchildren, the children of their other son Milorad, who were visiting and were playing in the yard.

A Boxer at the University

The Bijelic's themselves say that there was nothing very serious behind that. Simply a children's argument. They know that time heals everything, and in the months that followed they lived in the hope that all the errors would gradually be corrected. But then something happened which no one anticipated. Nikola's son Slobodan Bijelic, a professor, the same one whose broken arm had already healed, was slugged on 6 November in his office at the School of Technology, where he was chairman of the examinations commission.

He was slugged right in the face by his fellow faculty member Ruzdi Sefa, also a member of the examinations commission.

Vojislav Ristic, a student in that school of the university who was doing his military service, had received leave of absence from his offices to take his graduation examination. Before that, of course, he had submitted his paper. A commission had been set up at the school consisting of the following professors: Slobodan Bijelic, chairman, and members: Ruzdi Sefa, Nevzet Selimi and Dragan Savovic.

All members of the commission had each received a copy of Ristic's paper to read, and within 7 days, as stated in law and the regulations of the school, to submit written criticism to the head of the department. There was no criticism within the period specified, and the chairman of the commission, Slobodan Bijelic, scheduled the examination. All the members of the commission arrived on time except Professor Ruzdi Sefa, they waited for him nearly an hour.

"When he finally made his appearance," Bijelic relates, "I asked him whether he knew that we were holding an examination. He responded very sarcastically: 'Do you mean to tell me that that student is going to be defending this paper of his?' I answered him: 'Why not, when no one had any criticism to make!' Then Sefa said that he thought that this paper could not be accepted, since the student had made use of the literature. I explained to him that he was entitled to that and that that was no obstacle to a man's defending his work. Moreover, I told him, You can state your opinion separately. And Dobrivoje Stojanovic, head of the department, told him that he was wrong. Then he began to insult me. He told me 'not to be stupid' and other pejoratives which are not fit to print. We began to argue, and at one point he ran up and hit me with his fist in the temple. He wanted to continue, but my colleagues prevented him...."

"Enough Unhappiness..."

Professor Slobodan Bijelic, incidentally, is the secretary of the primary organization of the League of Communists in his section, but he is demoralized by everything he has experienced, and the only thing he has decided for certain at present is that he will get as far as he can from this place.

We sought out Professor Ruzdi Sefa both at the university and at home, but we did not manage to find him. It is said that he is evading all talk about this. Especially with newsmen. He made a statement to the dean of the school in which he admits that he hit Bijelic, but he says that he was provoked.

The testimony of eyewitnesses of this unpleasant event are in the dean's office of the School of Technology. It's secretary Isa Neziri did not dare to show these statements to us without permission of the dean, Vuk Savic. We in turn sought out Savic for 2 days at the university and by telephone through his secretary, but he was either busy or out.

Nevertheless, we did learn that Nevzet Selimi, an eyewitness to the event, had declared that "both were nervous and were arguing," while the others felt that Sefa had without good reason disputed the right of the student Vojislav Ristic to defend his paper and that he had struck Bijelic without cause.

The examination was nevertheless held even without Professor Ruzdi Sefa. He was replaced on the commission by Professor Dobrivoje Stojanovic, and the student Vojislav Ristic graduated with a grade of 7.

This is not the only case we know of when professors have gotten into a fist fight. There have been quite a few such settling of accounts in our other cities, in some places firearms were even drawn, and there have been tragedies.

We said this to Professor Bijelic and his parents.

"Yes, it has happened," they admitted. "But we have had enough unhappiness, better to move away."

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